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"I must say that, as a litigant, I should dread a law suit beyond
almost anything short of sickness and death."'
"The practical thing for a traveller who is uncertain of his path is
not to proceed in the wrong direction: it is to consider how to find the
right one." 2
"And if our theory is wrong it is certainly more intelligent to try to
set it right by making appropriate qualifications than to attempt
blindly to cling both to the theory and to the fact that contradicts it
on the pretext that theories and facts belong to different worlds."3
"It is essential ... to rid ourselves of deeprooted, often uncritically
repeated prejudices." 4
"An unlearned carpenter of my acquaintance once said in my hear-
ing, 'There is very little difference between one man and another;
but what little there is, is very important.' -5
"All systems which deny the fundamental diversity of men . . .
are essentially unjust and unsteady."'6
"The most significant advances in intellectual thinking are charac-
terized by the focusing of critical attention upon facts and issues
which were formerly considered unimportant, indecent or self-
evident." 7
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I.
When, in any area directly affecting human beings, there exists
a grave unsolved problem, and when the absence of a solution leads
to many tragedies, then those who, well aware of the problem, seek
to conceal or belittle its importance, may be considered morally
irresponsible. Why? Because they tend to create a mood of
complacency towards the tragedies, and because such complacency
impedes efforts that may, at least partly, help to solve the problem.
One such problem which, as long as it remains unsolved,
will yield daily tragedies, is that of obtaining accurate determina-
tions of the facts in the trials of law suits. When, some twenty
years ago, a prosecutor smugly remarked that innocent men were
never convicted of crimes, Borchard replied, in 1932, by publishing
his great book, Convicting The Innocent, which disclosed that many
men have gone to jail for crimes they did not commit, because
the trial courts had made mistakes about the facts. Since such
mistakes are due to defects8 in the methods of judicial fact-deter-
mination-defects that cause trouble in civil as well as criminal
litigation-it follows that men not only lose their liberty but also
often lose their property, their savings, their jobs, or their reputa-
tions, through court judgments based on judicial "findings" of
facts that never actually happened. Here is a moral problem of the
first magnitude.
The problem exists for these reasons: The decision of a law
suit, it is said, requires the application of a legal rule to the facts
of the case.' In most law suits, the litigants dispute solely about
the facts, e.g., whether, on a certain day in the past, Gross made a
promise to Gentle, or Tit hit Tat. As, at the time of the trial, those
facts are past events, the trial court-a trial judge (in a non-jury
case) or a jury-can't observe them. The judge or jury can do no
more than to form a belief about those past events. That belief
is formed after listening to the testimony of witnesses who have
(or purport to have) observed those events. In most law suits, the
witnesses testify in open court and contradict one another. In
such a suit, the facts, for decisional purposes, are then not neces-
sarily the actual facts. They are merely, at best, the belief of
8 Some of these defects derive from ineradicable human frailties but others
are eradicable.
9 That this statement is over-simplified, I shall try to show later.
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the trial judge or jury about those actual past events. For the
practical purposes of a court decision, it does not matter what the
actual facts were. All that matters is that belief."0 That belief,
at best, is a guess based upon a belief-a guess-about the
believability of some rather than other witnesses.
That belief of the trial judge or jury-which, to repeat, is all
that, judicially, constitutes the facts of the case4-is by no means
sure to be the same as or even to approximate the actual past
events, because of the following: (1) Testimony is notoriously
fallible: witnesses sometimes lie, and honest witnesses frequently
err in [a] observing events, [b] in remembering their observations,
and [c] in communicating those memories in the courtroom. (2)
Trial judges and juries are fallible in determining (guessing) which
(if any) of the several disagreeing witnesses has reliably reported
the actual facts. These fallibilities cause those tragic blunders of
the kind described by Borchard, and also cause those that are
encountered in civil suits. Doubtless the results of these fallibilities
prompted Learned Hand, our wisest judge, to remark, after years
of service as a trial judge: "I must say that, as a litigant, I
should dread a law suit beyond almost anything short of sickness
and death.' 2
These fallibilities may be viewed from what may seem to be
another angle: They interfere with the prediction of future court
decisions. When, on April 10, 1952, Mr. Hopeful acts, no one can
then tell him what, if a law suit should later arise-say in 1954-
relative to his conduct on April 10, 1952, those who will appear as
witnesses in 1954 will testify about that conduct. Nor, on April 10,
1952, can any one tell which of the stories of the witnesses, who
will appear in court in 1954, will be believed by the trial judge
or jury trying that case. Indeed, no one can tell, in 1952, whether
such a suit in 1954 will be tried before a judge without a jury or
with a jury, or who the judge or jurors will be. Consequqntly,
even if, on April 10, 1952, when Hopeful acts, a lawyer can reliably
predict what legal rule the court will apply in any such future law
10 For a closer analysis, see lit re Fried, 161 F. 2d 453, 462-464 (2d Cir. 1947).
11 It will be seen, as we go on, that, often, what matters is not actually that
belief but, rather, what either purports to be or (more often) is assumed to be
that belief.
12 Hand, supra note 1, at 10.
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suit, and how that court will interpret that rule,'" still no one can
at all reliably predict that the trial court will correctly ascertain
Hopeful's conduct on April 10, 1952-and therefore no one can at
all reliably predict, on April 10, 1952, what that future court decision
will be.
Now to speak of this litigation-uncertainty-this decision-
unpredictability-is usually but another way of speaking of the
moral problem to which I have referred. For many of the very
factors which prevent prediction of decisions also account for the
mistakes which yield the tragedies. Some persons, however, regard
as of major importance the predictability aspect of the decisional
process. Some of them can't bear to contemplate a condition in
which competent lawyers are unable to foresee the decisions in
most law suits that have not yet been begun. They therefore shut
their eyes to the obstacles to judicial determination of the facts of
cases (e.g., whether Gross made a promise to Gentle, or Tit hit Tat).
Many such eye-shutters contrive description of, or theories con-
cerning, the decisional process which, largely disregarding those
obstacles, make it seem that prediction of court decisions of most
future law suits, is or can be, relatively simple. Because they want
to think that most future decisions are, or could be, predictable,
they disregard the factors which interfere with such predictions;
but, as those same factors cause many court-house tragedies, those
would-be predicters ignore those tragedies and their causes.
Such persons create the false impression that correct court-
house fact-finding is relatively simple, that errors in such fact-
finding seldom occur or can easily be avoided-and that therefore
the moral problem posed by defective trial-court fact-finding de-
serves relatively little attention. In short, thanks to their eagerness
to have decisions predictable, they blind themselves, and others, to
the circumstances that give rise to that problem, and thus, although
unintentionally, lend support to the smug and morally irresponsible
position of the prosecutor to whose remarks Borchard's book was
a reply.
As that problem ought not be shirked, it is desirable, if possible,
to expose the fallacies of the prediction-addicts. For, if the
13 Should the trial be by jury, the rule will appear only in the judge's charge
to the jury and, if there is a general verdict, the jury may well ignore that rule.
More, as we shall see, the jury may ignore the evidence.
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fatuousness of their hopes is demonstrated, they may cease to
pooh-pooh the immense extent of the trial-court uncertainties which
bring about unjust decisions that wreck the lives of altogether too
many litigants. The prediction zealots may then come to see the
pressing need, in the interest of morality, for "a wide-spread ap-
preciation of the great difficulty of arriving at the truth through
the taking of testimony."'14
Conspicuous among these zealots is an unusually brilliant
lawyer, who is also a sagacious legal thinker and learned philosopher,
Felix S. Cohen. He has shed light on many dark spots in the legal
realm. In so doing, he has repeatedly, and wisely, stressed the moral
problem inherent in the practical operations of court-house govern-
ment. If the views of so keen a thinker concerning decision-predic-
tion turn out to be fallacious, we may be reasonably sure that the
views of less able prediction-addicts will be at least equally
unsound. I select Cohen's views for criticism, then, precisely
because of his outstanding ability and his lively interest in morality.
II.
Cohen's pertinent writings began with an article published
in 1931,"5 which he incorporated in his book, Ethical Systems and
Legal Ideals, published in 1933. In that book, he defined "law"
as a "body of rules according to which the courts . . . decide
cases."'" "Law," so defined, must, he said, be subjected to moral
evaluation; sound legal criticism is no more, ultimately, than ethical
criticism: "Fundamental", he said, "to all adequate thought on
politics and society lies the question of what law ought to do, the
search for valid standards of legal criticism. The problem is . . .
an ethical one, since legal criticism is a passing of judgments of
good and bad, right and wrong, upon human acts and works."' 7
There "is no way of escaping the final responsibility of law
to morality."'"
14 Otto, Testimony and Human Nature, 9 J. or CRim. L. & CRn0LooY 98
(1918). It is encouraging that the transcendant importance of trial-court fact-finding
and its moral implications have begun to attain recognition by some distinguished
legal thinkers. See, e.g., Stone, Book Review, 63 HA~v. L. REv. 1466 (1950); cf.
McAllister, The Big Case, 64 HARv. L. REv. 27, 57, 61 (1950).
15 Cohen, The Ethical Basis of Legal Criticism, 41 YALE L. J. 201 (1931).
16 Co=EN, ErmcAL SYSTEFmS Am LEGAL IDFALs 11-12 (1933).
17 Id. at 2.
18 Id. at 16-17.
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Cohen maintained that "the ideal of legal criticism is an
analysis of legal elements into ultimate terms of that which makes
human life good."19 He wrote that the standard of such criticism is
this: "The law ought to bring about as much good as it can."2
One should say, "This decision or statute is desirable because in
some way it promotes the good life."' The idea of "justice" provides
the same standard, one which "demands the complete calculation
of legal activities in terms of the good life."12 Cohen maintained
that this ethical standard imposes two duties: [1] "in thought,
the translation of the books of the law into the universal language
of human joys and sufferings, [2] in practice, the struggle for the
attainment of ideals thus discovered."2 He took the position that
"the instrumental value of law is simply its value in promoting
the good life of those whom it affects, and that any law, or other
element of the legal order which has effects upon human life, can
be judged to be good or bad in the light of those effects." 24
Since he was concerned, as a moralist, with the practical effects,
good or bad, of decisions on men's lives, one would naturally expect
that he would interest himself in observing the practical effects, on
the lives of particular men, of particular decisions-and therefore,
the practical effects on those lives of trial-court decisions and thus
of trial-court fact-findings. But he never mentioned such matters;
he displayed an indifference to them.
That indifference he soon began to couple with this thesis:
Through sufficient study, it will be possible to predict the decisions
in most future law suits. This prediction thesis he put forward
explicitly in articles published in 1935,' 5 1937,2" and 1950.27 But
the assumptions on which he grounds that thesis had already been
stated in his book in 1933. There he declared that legal criticism-
i.e., ethical criticism of "law"-must rest on a study, not of par-
ticular decisions, but of a "system" to which those decisions are
subsidiary.
19 Id. at 54.
20 Id. at 7.
21 Id. at 21.
22 Id. at 95.
2 Id. at 229.
2 Id. at 42.
25 Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 CoL. L.
REv. 808 (1935).
26 Cohen, The Problems of a Functional Jurisprudence, 1 MoD. L. REv. 5 (1937).
27 Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L..3. 238 (1950).
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Although in that book he said that "law" is a "body of rules
according to which the courts ... decide cases", he explained that
those rules are not the rules "enunciated by courts" but the "pat-
tern in which judges decide cases."2 He asserted 9 that "particular
decisions are significant only in the context of potential decisions
systematically related .... [In] the actual practices of courts
uniformities and systematic relations" can be found. We should
seek a "systematic knowledge of legal decisions", their "systematic
implications", the "systematic relations of cause and effect."" He
wrote that "law is a creature of uniformity.)31
His aim was a formulation of "principles of judicial conduct."
This formulation could be attained by a "systematic analysis of
the economic and social background, the moral presuppositions,.
and the psychological habits of thoughts of judges and other legal
officials", which "play a governing role." 2
However, when he referred to the "psychological" habits of
judges, he did not mean their individual, unique reactions, but the
"psychological habits" common to all such persons. For, he said,
that although the "personal desires and ideals of those in whom
law administration is vested can never be wholly negligible", never-
theless this factor will be of "rather inconsiderable importance",
and its effects will be "reduced to a minimum", wherever the "class"
of such men "is comparatively homogeneous in outlook"; 3 and in
our judiciary, according to Cohen, such a homogeneous outlook
prevails. "The play of personal beliefs as to the desirability of a
given rule or ruling receives its primary check in the feeling of the
officer of law that his office entails a duty to the legal order as such,
whatever its content"; above all, the "professional spirit.., compels
allegiance to one's co-workers and to the traditions of one's craft."
For example, the "trial judge loses professional prestige when he is
too frequently overruled in an appellate tribunal." In many ways,
"professional loyalty constitutes an effective check upon the exercise
of legal discretion ... .34
2 COEMN, ETMCAL SYSTMS AND LEGAL IDEALS 11-12 (1933).
29 Id. at 238 (emphasis supplied).
30 Id. at 239, 249.
31 Id. at 270 (emphasis supplied).
32 Id. at 238.
33 Id. at 241-242 (emphasis supplied).
34 Id. at 242-243.
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In Cohen's article published in 1935,15 he overtly used these
assumptions as the basis of his prediction thesis. Now he said that,
although there is a "large realm of uncertainty in the actual law",
it is important to see the "relevance of significant, predictable,
social determinants that govern the course of judicial decision."
For "actual experience does reveal a significant body of predictable
uniformity in the behavior of courts." This "predictable uni-
formity", he wrote, can be discovered by "probing behind [each]
decision to the forces which it reflects", and by recognizing that
the "motivating forces that mold decisions" are "social forces",
because "every decision is a social event", a "function of social
forces", a "product of social determinants."36 There is need "to
weigh the social forces which are represented on the bench", 7 need
also for a "publication... showing the political, economic and pro-
fessional background and activities of our various judges."38 He
expressed confidence that, with adequate "research", there would be
success in "formulating the social forces which mold ... decisions.""'
In his 1937 paper,4" he restated these views. There he said
that "the study of the social factors that determine the course of
judicial decision" is an "essential part of the lawyer's outfitting if
he is to predict with accuracy the probable course of his client's
plans." Some "students of the law" had already made "illuminating
studies of the social, economic and political backgrounds of judges
and decisions." Studies of that kind, he suggested, were on the right
track in "helping us to predict judicial behavior", for "every legal
problem [can] be interpreted as a question concerning the positive
behavior of judges."'"
In his 1950 paper,42 Cohen repeats this thesis, in somewhat
different terminology. By careful study, he writes, we can develop
a fairly dependable "scientific approach" to the prediction of deci-
sions; those who think otherwise are "mystics" who unjustifiably
exaggerate the uncertainties. His argument now runs as follows:
35 Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and The Functional Approach, 35 COL. L.
REV. 808 (1935).
36 Id. at 843-845 (emphasis supplied).
37 Id. at 833.
38 Id. at 846.
39 Id. at 845 (emphasis supplied).
40 Cohen, The Problems of a Functional Jurisprudence, 1 MoD. L. REY. 5 (1937).
41 Id. at 12-13, 14-15.
4-2 Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L.J. 238 (1950).
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The study of decisions, when founded on conventional assumptions
of the way courts employ precedents, creates an impression of im-
mense uncertainty, of vast unpredictability. But this impression
misleads. It will be dissipated if we discern the "value attitudes"
of judges. This, says Cohen, is to be done by watching what deci-
sions a particular judge uses as precedents for other decisions. The
judge's "selectivity operations" disclose his "value selectivities",
his "implicit value judgments." Thus we can learn the judge's
(Iselectivity patterns", or "value patterns". Those "patterns" "shape
the line of development of any precedent." As on those "patterns"
depend the way judges utilize and modify precedents, we can find
out much "about the relevant factors in plotting the path of a
precedent." True, each judge has his own peculiar personal "value
attitudes" (or "value standards"). But, says Cohen, they do not
interfere with the discovery of the more general "paths" of prece-
dents. For the "egocentric distortions" of any particular judge-
"those directions of activity that are peculiar to himself"-are
"likely to cancel out against the opposing directions" of other judges
who have preceded him and of his colleagues on the bench. He is
constrained by his exercise of the duties of his "office" to surrender
his inclination to follow those "directions peculiar to himself." Why?
Because "lines of precedent" are "large-scale social facts", and
"large-scale social facts cannot be explained in terms of the atomic
idiosyncracies and personal prejudices of individuals." Conse-
quently, to explain how "a rule of law comes into being or changes",
one can ignore the personal, individual, private, "egocentric dis-
tortions" affecting any particular judge. That is "why a realistic
view" of precedents "requires an exploration of group-enforced
value patterns."
In his 1937 paper, Cohen said that, in the effort to "predict
judicial behavior", studies of the psychological factors affecting
individual judges had not reached "any significant result."'4 Simi-
larly, in his 1950 paper, he writes that such studies have "not yet
produced any useful techniques for predicting judicial decisions. ' '44
Although judges have some "value judgments which are inarticulate
and unconscious", it is possible neverthless "to ferret out the value
judgments that underlie decisions" by examining judicial opinions;
43 1 MoD. L. REV. at 13.
44 59 YALE L.J. at 261.
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thereby we can lay bare a judge's "suppressed premises". For "the
meaning of a value standard is to be found in its actual and possible
applications.... Concretely, we can expect to find the value stand-
ards of a judge in his reactions to day-to-day problems of statutory
construction, the weight of precedents, standards of 'reasonable
care' or 'due process' and causation. We find the value patterns of
a judge, as of any other human being, in the choices he makes be-
tween competing interpretations of fact, in the selection of value-
charged words to describe given facts, and in the implicit and inar-
ticulate premises of his arguments." Cohen summarizes thus: "In
the suppressed moral premises of judicial opinions, in the choices of
words of different value tones, in the selection, classification and
interpretation of. facts and precedents, and in the tracing of lines
of causation, we find prime indicators of the value patterns of a
judge, a judiciary .... "
Here, it may be noted in passing, Cohen substantially agrees
with Llewellyn, who has often engaged in a search for uniform "real
rules", or "latent rules", behind the "paper rules" used in judicial
opinions. The "real rules", says Llewellyn, are "akin to" but lie
"deeper" than the "paper rules"; and, by "cutting below" the
superficial level "of the paper rules" to the "real rules", one can
achieve a "working approximation of uniformity or regularity", and
discover a "great realm of workable predictability", in "judicial
behavior" (in the "practices of the courts"). The search "for the
similarities in [the] attitudes and behavior" of diverse judges is,
Llewellyn writes, a "search for predictabilities ... which transcend
individuality"; there is no need of "delving into all the vagaries of
individual psychology."45
In short; Cohen (more or less like Llewellyn) apparently
would have us believe the following: (1) The operative "value
patterns" or "value attitudes" of particular judges can be discovered
without too much difficulty; (2) by discovering them, we will know
in advance what legal rules any particular judge will apply in any
particular case, how he will interpret those rules, and how he will
"interpret" the "facts" of that case; (3) in that way, it is possible
45 See the following articles by Llewellyn: A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next
Step, 30 CoL. L. Rv. 431 (1930); The Rule of Law in Our Case Law, 47 YAW
L.J. 1243 (1938); On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence, 26 A.B.A.J.
418 (1940); MY PHiLosopHY OF LAW 183 (1941).
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to predict, with a fair degree of accuracy, the decisions of most
future individual law suits.
III.
But what of the fact-findings of trial courts? Will it be pos-
sible, via Cohen's method, to predict how, in most future law suits
not yet begun, trial judges and juries will "find" the facts? No
mention of that question occurs in Cohen's book or his 1935 and
1937 papers.4" With a few brief exceptions (to be discussed later)
his 1950 paper also ignores it. For Cohen's prediction thesis relates
to prediction of decisions only after the trial courts have already
determined-reached their beliefs about-the facts, i.e., what hap-
pened in the past. Cohen is preoccupied with "plotting the paths
of precedents", with prophesies concerning the precedents the courts
will use, and how they will use them, in deciding cases.
This preoccupation severely restricts the scope of his prediction
thesis, assuming it to be otherwise valid. For, in the great majority
of suits, the lawyers have not the slightest difficulty in foreseeing
what legal rules the courts will apply, since most of those rules are
well settled and precise, and neither the parties nor the judges bother
with them, because the sole issues are fact issues-such as whether
Ding was driving at 80 miles an hour when he hit Dong, or that
Nervous shot and killed High, or that Simple handed the deed to
his farm to Simon.
Most suits, then, are "fact suits"-suits in which the decisions
depend solely on the beliefs of the trial judges or juries about the
past events the occurrence of which is in dispute." Prediction of
future decisions in "fact suits" not yet commenced means prediction
of those future beliefs of trial judges or juries about the past facts.
To predict such a decision, one must prophesy that the trial judge
or jury will or will not believe that Ding was driving at 80 miles
an hour when he hit Dong, or that Nervous did shoot and kill High,
or that Simple did hand the deed to his farm to Simon.
The job of determining-"finding"-the facts is for the trial
court. Its fact determination is usually final, especially when, as
in most law suits, witnesses testify orally and flatly contradict one
40 This is also the flaw in Llewellyn's prediction thesis.
47 Sometimes there is no such dispute: The parties may have stipulated the facts,
or one party, by demurrer or motion to dismiss, may have admitted the other
party's fact-assertions.
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another.4 s Why? Because (1) in any such case, determination of
the facts requires an estimate of the credibility of the respective
witnesses; and (2) as their demeanor, while testifying, counts heav-
ily in appraising their credibility-their observable demeanor, as
"wordless language", being an important part of the evidence 9- -
the upper court, which can't see and hear the witnesses, and which
therefore has no access to this demeanor evidence, usually adopts
the trial court's "finding" of the facts. In the upper court, those
facts, so "found", are fixed.data, i.e., "given"-given to it by the
trial court.
For that reason, and because most suits are exclusively "facts
suits", only a tiny percentage of trial-court decisions are appealed,
and the upper courts affirm most of the decisions in the few cases
that are appealed. In the overwhelming majority of cases, trial-
court fact-findings, and thus trial-court decisions, spell the fate of
the litigants. Wherefore, to repeat, prediction of most decisions
means prediction of the trial courts' beliefs about the facts.
It follows that the crucial test of Cohen's thesis is this:
Whether it is possible-through knowledge of judges' "value-atti-
tudes", or "value patterns", or of their "social, economic, and polit-
ical background", or by a study of their opinions-to predict that,
in a particular future law suit, a trial judge (if the trial is jury-less)
or a jury will believe, after listening to the oral testimony of dis-
agreeing witnesses, that, for example, on January 8, 1945, Sleek
promised to pay Mild $10,000; or that Old was drunk when he
signed his will; or that Cute attended a Communist meeting on
October 11, 1947; or that Dolt, a week before Rough died of
poisoning, threatened to kill him. Can Cohen, or anyone else, two
years (or even a week) before a suit has begun, make any such
prophecy with a fair degree of accuracy? Will Cohen's prediction
technique, even if perfected, render such predictions possible?
48 See Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F. 2d 537 (2d Cir. 1950) and Broadcast Music, Inc.
v. Havana Madrid Restaurant Corp., 175 F. 2d 77 (2d Cir. 1949) for quali-
fications of this statement, qualifications which may be disregarded for present
purposes.
49 See, e.g., W ImORE, EVIDmENCE § 946 (3d ed. 1940); Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
Havana Madrid 'Corp., supra note 48 and cases there cited. That the demeanor of
witnesses is no'infallible clue to their credibility, see e.g., RAM, FACTS (4th ed. 1890).
5o Qualifications of this statement are noted below.
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IV.
As already noted, Cohen's book and his subsequent 1935 and
1937 papers do not discuss such questions. His 1950 paper contains
but a few brief statements which perhaps may be thought to bear on
them. (1) "Lawyers", he writes, "have ample opportunity to know
how earnestly two litigants will swear to two inconsistent statements
of a single event. Lawyers thus have special opportunities to learn
what many logicians have not yet recognized: that truth on earth
is a matter of degree, and that, whatever may be the case in Heaven,
a terrestrial major league batting average above .300 is nothing to
be sneezed at.... From the standpoint of rigorous logic, a propo-
sition is either true or false. There is no middle ground .... "
[But] the "simple, traditional true-false dichotomy is often quite
useless."'" (2) If a "defendant [is] charged with reckless driving",
and if the witnesses "each honestly gives his views, the court will
have the benefit of synoptic vision. Appreciation of the importance
of such synoptic vision is a distinguishing mark of a liberal civili-
zation.... The accumulation of different views of the same event
is the only remedy we have found for fanaticism.... ,,r2
But how will such knowledge either prevent the tragedies
caused by mistakes in the judicial determinations of simple fact-
issues, or assist in the prediction of decisions that turn on those
determinations? In a prosecution for passing counterfeit money in
New York City on November 20, 1948, three witnesses testify that
they saw the defendant pass the money in that city on that date,
and two witnesses testify that during the entire month of that No-
vember the defendant was with them in Austin, Texas. The trial
judge or jury must determine whether the defendant was or was
not in New York on that day, and, in so determining, cannot fall
back on the comforting idea that "truth on earth is a matter of
degree", or decide that fact issue by virtue of a "synoptic vision"
supplied by the flatly contradictory testimony. The trial court must
use the "true-false dichotomy". No "middle ground" position will
serve.
Cohen cites with approval 3 Thouless, How To Think Straight.
But Cohen has forgotten Thouless' warning about a fallacious use
51 59 YALE L.J. at 239.
52 Id. at 241-242.
53 Id. at 242 n. 3, 244 n. 6.
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of the notion of compromise. "Clearly", says Thouless, 4 "the truth
does not always lie in the mean position between two extremes, and
however attractive such a notion may be, it is of no practical use
in discovering where the truth lies, because every view can be
represented as the mean between two extremes." Moreover "the
truth is just as likely to lie on one extreme as in the middle position."
It is not, says Thouless, safe, sound and intelligent to accept the
idea that two and two make five as a mean between the "extreme
position" that they make four and the other "extreme position"
that they make six.
And so, if an innocent man, because of mistaken fact finding,
is erroneously convicted of a crime and sent to jail for a year,
when the judge could have given him ten years, you may call that
a fair compromise-but the innocent man in jail will righteously
object. So, too, if Clever sues Frail for $20,000, when in truth Frail
owes Clever nothing, it will not please Frail if the trial court enters
a "compromise" judgment for $10,000.
V.
However, in his 1950 paper, Cohen does make a third statement
which comes somewhat closer to the question of the predictability
of trial-court fact-finding: "The question that confronts juris-
prudence", he writes, "is whether the practical know-how that en-
ables an experienced judge to discount bias can be formulated and
rendered more systematic and less haphazard."15 Cohen never ex-
plicitly replies to that question that "confronts jurisprudence", but
the ensuing pages of his article imply an affirmative answer. As
nowhere does he at all clearly state his position concerning trial
court fact-finding, it may be justifiable to infer his position from
that implied answer. On that assumption, his position appears to be
this: (a) All (or most) errors in testimony are due to the biases
of the witnesses. (b) Most trial judges are so "experienced" that
they possess a "practical know-how" by which they invariably--or
usually-perceive and "discount" such biases. (c) The operations
of this "know-how" can be "formulated and rendered more syste-
matic". (d) Consequently, the effects of this "know-how" in par-
ticular lawsuits can be known. (e) Wherefore, most trial-court
determinations of fact can be predicted.
54 THOUL.ss, How To Ti Nx STRAIGIET 42-45 (1949).
55 59 YAL L.J. at 244.
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But any such notion of fact-finding clashes with the views of
all those who-like Stephen,56 Maine,57 Gross58 and Wigmore 9 -
have with care studied many trials. These writers agree on the fol-
lowing: (1) Many mistakes of witnesses stem not from bias but
from honest errors in their original observations of the past events
at the time those events occurred, or from honest mistakes of mem-
ory about those observations. (2) Frequently, no one can discover
whether or not a witness has made such honest errors. (3) Delib-
erately perjured testimony also often goes undetected. (4) The
unconscious bias of an honest witness is even more difficult to
detect.60 (5) Above all, the methods used by trial judges in deter-
mining whether or not to believe particular witnesses cannot be
formulated in rules and rendered systematic.
Since this last point, especially, hits Cohen's apparent thesis
in the solar plexus, it is worthwhile to quote these comments: "How
is it possible", wrote Stephen,"' "to tell how far the powers of obser-
vation and memory of a man [i.e., a witness] seen once for a few
minutes enable him, and how far the innumerable motives by any
one or more of which he may be actuated dispose him, to tell the
truth upon the matter on which he testifies? Cross-examination
supplies a test to a certain extent, but those who have seen most
of its application will be disposed to trust it least as a proof that a
man not shaken by it ought to be believed. A cool, steady liar who
happens not to be open to contradiction will baffle the most skillful
cross-examiner in the absence of accidents, which are not so common
in practice as persons who take their notions on the subject from
anecdotes or fiction would suppose. No rules of evidence which the
56 STEPHEN, THE INDIAN EVIDENCE AcT, wiTH AN INTRODUCTION ON THE PRIN-
crPLEs or JUDICIAL Evmc (1872).
57 MAINE, VILLAGE-Co f,&UNITIES 317-318 (4th ed. 1881); ci. MAINE, EARLY
HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONS 48-50 (1875).
8 GROSS, CRIMIINAL INVESTIGATION (transl. 1907); GROSS, CRII~N~AL PSYCHOL-
ooY (transl. 1911).
,9 WIG31ORE, PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROOF (1913; 2d ed. 1931).
60 TRAI, THE PRISONER AT H BAR 228 (2d ed. 1908), after discussing honest
but biased witnesses, says: "The liar with his prepared lie is far less dangerous
than the honest but mistaken witness, or the witness who draws inadvertently upon
his imagination." MOORE, FACTS § 1113 (1908) writes: "Nothing is more deceitful
than half the truth, and biased witnesses are much addicted to half truths and
coloring of facts. Such a witness is more dangerous than one who commits a
gross perjury .... "
61 STmPHEN, op. cit. supra note 56, at 41-43.
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legislator can enact can perceptibly affect this difficulty. Judges
[i.e., trial judges] must deal with it as well as they can by the use
of their natural faculties and acquired experience, and the mis-
carriages of justice in which they will be involved by reason of it
must be set down to the imperfection of our means of arriving at
truth. The natural and acquired shrewdness and experience by
which an observant man forms an opinion as to whether a witness
is or is not lying, is by far the most important of all a [trial] judge's
qualifications, infinitely more important than any acquaintance with
law or with rules of evidence. No trial ever occurs in which the
exercise of this faculty is not required; but it is only in exceptional
cases that questions arise which present any legal difficulty, or in
which it is necessary to exercise any particular ingenuity in putting
together the different facts which the evidence tends to establish.
This pre-eminently important power for a [trial] judge is not to
be learnt out of books. Insofar as it can be acquired at all, it is
to be acquired only by experience, for the acquisition of which the
position of a judge is by no means peculiarly favourable. People
come before him with their cases ready prepared, and given the
evidence which they have determined to give. Unless he knows
them in their unrestrained and familiar moments, he will have great
difficulty in finding any good reason for believing one man rather
than another....
"Upon the whole, it must be admitted that little that is really
serviceable can be said upon the inference from an assertion [by a
witness] to the truth of the matter asserted. The observations of
which the matter admits are either generalities too vague to be of
much practical use, or they are so narrow and special that they can
be learnt only by personal observation and practical experience.
Such observations are seldom, if ever thrown by those who make
them into the form of express propositions. Indeed, for obvious
reasons, it would be impossible to do so. The most acute observer
would never be able to catalogue the tones of voice, the passing
shades of expression or the unconscious gestures which he had learnt
to associate with falsehood; and if he did, his observations would
probably be of little use to others. Every one must learn matters
of this sort of himself, and though no sort of knowledge is so im-
portant to a judge, no rules can be laid down for its acquisition....
No process is gone through, the correctness of which can be inde-
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pendently tested. The judge has nothing to trust but his own
natural and acquired sagacity."
Sir Henry Maine agreed with Stephen. He said that there are
no "rules to guide" a "Judge of the Fact" in "drawing inferences
from the assertion of a witness to the existence of the facts asserted
by him." "It is", he said, "in the passage from the statements of
a witness to the inference that those statements are true, that judicial
inquiries generally break down. The English procedure of exami-
nation is doubtless entitled to high praise; but, on the whole, it is
the rarest and highest personal accomplishment of a judge to make
allowance for the ignorance and timidity of witnesses, and to see
through the confident and plausible liar. Nor can any general rules
be laid down for the acquisition of this power, which has methods
of operation peculiar to itself, and almost undefinable."' 2
Several points made by Stephen merit marked attention:
(1) Only in "exceptional cases" do questions arise presenting
any "legal difficulty", that is, any difficulty about the applicable
legal rule or precedent.
(2) The prime difficulty in almost every law suit is that of
determining the facts. That determination involves two different
kinds of inferences: (a) The trial court has to make up its mind
as to the credibility of the several witnesses. If it believes a witness'
statement of a fact, the trial court is inferring from his statement
that it is a fact. For example, a witness, Alert, testifies that a day
after the murder of Weak, Alert saw, in the possession of the de-
fendant Snide, the knife that killed Weak; another witness, Squint,
testifies that all during that same day he saw the knife in the pos-
session of Rogue. If the trial court believes Alert's testimony and
disbelieves Squint's, it becomes an "established" fact, for the pur-
poses of decision, that Snide had the knife on that day. Wigmore
calls such an inference a "testimonial inference";63 it might also
be called a "primary inference"."4 (b) From a fact taken as a fact
62 MAINE, op. cit. supra note 57, at 317-318.
63 WIGIORE, PRMCIpL S OF JUDICIAL PROOF 16 (2d ed. 1931).
64 At first glance, it may seem that such an inference is not necessary where a
document (or other material object) is offered in evidence. But such evidence is
based on testimony. "It may be said that in strictness all evidence is oral, as
documents or other material things must be identified by oral evidence before the
court can take notice of them." STnEm., op. cit. supra note 56, at 11. "Real evi-
dence" is perhaps an exception. Also "judicial notice" dispenses with the -need to
prove a fact by evidence.
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by means of such a "testimonial" or "primary" inference, another
kind of inference--call it a "secondary" or "derivative" inference-
may be drawn, for instance, that Snide killed Weak. Several facts
reached by "primary" inferences or "derivative" inferences may be
put together to form still another "derivative" inference. The facts
are often found by a chain of "primary" and "derivative" infer-
ences.
6 5
(3) The making of what I have termed "derivative" infer-
ences, says Stephen, is usually easy for a trial judge. (Stephen does
not note that it may be more difficult for a jury, and that not infre-
quently jury verdicts are set aside because they cannot be justified
by any rational "derivative" inference from any substantial part
of 'the testimony even if that testimony be taken as true.)
(4) But, says Stephen (with whom Maine, Wigmore and
others agree), the drawing of "primary" or "testimonial" inferences
-which a trial-court must undertake in almost every law suit-
is a singularly baffling job, 6 and one for which there are no rules.
In other words, the pivotal element in almost every suit is the
belief or disbelief of the trial judge or jury in the sworn statements
of some of the persons who testify; the forming of that belief or
disbelief constitutes the prime difficulty in deciding most suits;
and no one can put into the shape of rules or generalizations the
means of correctly forming that belief or disbelief.
If able trial judges often fluke in ascertaining credibility, think
how much more likely it is that juries do. Yet Cohen (who, in the
thirty-four pages of his 1950 article, includes but one brief sentence
mentioning juries)" 7 does not discuss the capacity of jurors to un-
65 "It will be found upon examination that inferences employed in judicial
inquiries fall under two heads: (1) Inferences from an assertion whether oral or
documentary. (2) Inferences from facts which, upon the strength of such assertions,
are believed to exist, to facts of which the existence has not been so asserted ...
The judge hears with his own ears the statement of the witness and sees with his
own eyes the document produced in court. His task is to infer from what he thus
hears and sees the existence of facts which he neither sees nor bears." SEmPBM,
op. cit. supra note 56, at 38.
66 The derivative inferences "are generally considered to be more difficult than
to draw inferences from an assertion to the matter asserted. In fact, it is far easier
to combine materials supposed to be sound, than to ascertain that they are sound."
STEm=N, op. cit. supra note 56, at 46. For a somewhat more detailed discussion of
"primary" and "derivative" "secondary" inferences, see the Appendix (points I and
II) to the dissenting opinion in Wabash Corporation v. Ross Electric Corporation,
187. F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1951).
67 This one sentence, (59 YALE L.J. at 259) reads: "A value differential in
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cover witnesses' honest errors or lies; nor does he discuss the scant
likelihood that methods used by thousands of juries in reaching their
verdicts can be so formulated as to furnish the means of predicting
decisions in most future jury cases. Cohen's jurisprudence omits
"juries'prudence."
Inasmuch as the ways of witnesses, and the ways of trial judges
or jurors reacting to the witnesses, cannot be reduced to rules, they
are "un-ruly". Other factors affecting trial-court fact-finding and
blocking predictions are also unruly, e.g., missing witnesses, missing
documents, the skill or ineptitude of the lawyer representing one
or the other of the parties,68 and the ability or inability of litigants
to meet the expense of obtaining evidence-including the hiring of
expert accountants or engineers-essential to success in their suits. 9
Cohen shoves all these unruly factors under the rug. Appar-
ently he agrees with Patterson in accepting, without questioning,
the complacent "assumption which underlies the law... that govern-
mental officials [presumably including trial courts] are capable
of acquiring knowledge about facts sufficiently reliable to justify
the legal consequences attached to them."7 Perhaps Cohen also
attitude of judge and jury towards a given class will be reflected in differences of
judgment as to whether individuals of that given class are responsible for the wrongs
complained of." In his book, published in 1933, he fleetingly refers to the discrepancy
"between the instructions to the jury" and the "laws" of "jury behavior". But never
does he consider how that discrepancy blocks the search for "uniformities". Op. cit.
supra note 16, at 237. I find no mention of juries in his 1935 or 1937 papers.
6s Hornstein says that a lawyer can easily prophesy the decisions of nine-tenths
of the cases because they will be governed by obvious precedents. (He completely
neglects the difficulty of predicting the fact-findings.) As to the remaining one-tenth,
he says that the difficult part of prediction comes in guessing "whether the judge
will be convinced . . . that the precedents are in point, and sustain the principle
urged; that there are no conflicting precedents, that the precedents are reasonable;
and that no additional factors (including economic or social changes) now require
a different ruling. Whether a lawyer is 'good' then turns on his having been trained
to find prior decisions which bear on the principles involved in the problem; his
ability to reason (which includes the skill to anticipate which of conflicting precedents
or principles will prevail; and his general knowledge of the community interest
which will bear on the decision." Then Hornstein adds: "Even so, his prediction
may prove erroneous if these various elements are not adequately presented by the
advocates before the court when the matter reaches litigation .... But the lawyer
cannot base his advice on anticipation of inadequate presentation in the event that
a problem reaches the courts." Hornstein, A Lawyer Looks at the Law Schools, 1 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 516, 530-531 (1949). But often a lawyer does not know whether a
case will be adequately presented to the court. What then?
69 FRAN, COURTS ON T iAr 94-99 (1949); Frank, White Collar Justice, SAT.
EvE. POST, JULY 17, 1943; Frank, Book Review, 56 YALE L. J. 589 (1947).
70 PATTrRSOx, INTR DUCTiON TO JuRisPRuDENcE 30 (1946).
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agrees -with Patterson that "the rules of judicial proof are designed
to minimize errors due to the 'subjective' element.. ." in testimony.
If so, Cohen should heed Stephen who says, "The rules of evidence
may provide tests,... by which judges may be satisfied that the
quality of the materials upon which their judgments are to proceed
is not open to obvious objections; but they do not profess to enable
the judges to know whether or not a particular witness tells the
truth."'
One wonders what such as Cohen and Patterson have to say
about Learned Hand's remark that a law suit is to be feared beyond
almost anything short of sickness and death.
(To avoid misunderstanding of what I have said of a trial
court's "derivative" inferences, I must briefly digress to add the
following: When an upper court reviews a trial judge's decisions,
the upper court will usually accept his "primary" or "testimonial"
inferences, unless, in the light of undisputed documentary evidence
or for other reasons, they are absurd. 1 ' However, the upper court
will not necessarily accept a trial judge's "derivative" inference
even if it is rational: Where an alternative rational "derivative"
inference is possible, the upper court may adopt it, rejecting that
of the trial judge. But, in most jurisdictions, the same latitude is
not open with respect to a jury's general verdict: The upper court
must accept the jury's "derivative" inferences if rational, although
other alternative rational "derivative" inferences could be drawn
from the "testimonial" inferences." The remarks in this paragraph
should be read into every statement in this paper about the effect
on upper courts of trial court fact-finding.)
VI.
Recall now Cohen's remarks that personal idiosyncracies and
biases ("egocentric distortions") have a "rather inconsiderable im-
portance", and that their effects are "reduced to a minimum", be-
cause the men who participate in the process of making decisions
are "comparatively homogeneous in outlook", and are restrained by
a "professional spirit." Now witnesses surely play a leading part
71 STEhPEN, op. cit. supra note 56, at 42.
71a See Gindorff v. Prince, 189 F. 2d 877 (2d Cir. 1951).
72 For a more detailed discussion, see Wabash Corp. v. Ross Electrical Corp.,
187 F. 2d 577 (2d Cir. 1951) (dissenting opinion, Appendix, Point I).
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in that process, since they supply one of the most impbrtait ingre-
dients of most decisions. Do Cohen's remarks apply to witnesses?
Plainly they do not. Assume (what is often not true) that
witnesses are "comparatively homogeneous fi outlook." Still no such
general homogeneity will produce substantial similarity in their
observations of events and their memories *f their observations.
Their mistakes are peculiarly due to causes that are "private", indi-
vidual, idiosyncratic, usually hidden, without detectable "patterns".
No background of professional education, and no "professional
loyalty" to their "office", hold in check their "personal idiosyn-
crasies and biases".
All this should be obviotLs but, since it seems not to be to Cohen
and to many others who think decision-prediction fairly easy, I
shall quote two comments (out of many dozens) by lawyer's experi-
enced in coping with witnesses.73 Gross, 4 after noting that several
witnesses, speaking of the same incident, will differently characterize
it as "a very ordinary event" or "altogether a joke", or ,,quite
disgusting", says, "Now is it possible to think that people who
have so variously characterized the same event will give an identical
description of the mere fact? They have seen the event in accord-
ance with their attitude toward life. One has seen nothing; another
this; another that; and, although the thing may have lasted: only a
very short time, it made such an impression that each has in mind
a completely different picture which he now reproduces . .. To
compare the varieties of intellectual attitude among men generally,
we must start with some sense perception, which, combined with
mental perception, makes a not insignificant difference in each indi-
vidual.... One man overlooks half because he is looking at the
wrong place; another substitutes his own inferences for objects;
while another tends to observe the quality of objects and neglects
their quantity; and still another divides what is to be united, and
unites what is to be separated. If we keep in mind what profound
differences may result in this way, we must recognize the source of
the conflicting assertions by witnesses.... In order to know what
another person has seen and apprehended, we must first of all know
how he thinks, and that is impossible. If we know, at least approxi-
73 For many other such comments, see, e.g., WIGmopo, PRiNciPLE or JuDIcxAL
PROOF (2d ed. 1931).
74 GROSS, CMUNAL PSYCHOLOGY, §§ 35, 83 (1907), quoted in WicmoRE, op. cit.
supra note 73.
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mately,, the kind of mental process of a person who is as close as
possible to us in sex, age, culture, position, experience, etc., we
lose this knowledge with every step that leads to differences. We
know well what great influence is exercised by the multiplicity of
talents, superpositions, knowledge and apprehensions . .. The
individuality of the particular person makes [his] perception ...
individual, and makes it almost the creature of him who perceives."
Which is to say that witnesses are not fungible, and that their
perceptions are often not negotiable.
Barry writes that in the course of an argument before the
High Court in Australia, Mr. Justice Dixon remarked that the
ability to observe correctly "is an idiosyncracy, and that the ability
to give evidence in the witness-box in a clear, definite and convincing
manner is also an idiosyncracy, but that the two idiosyncracies are
not necessarily related.1
75
In his 1950 paper, Cohen, in support of his general thesis,
discourses at some length on some concepts of modern physical
science. That discussion, and his assertion that, in the decisional
process, somehow the private, idiosyncratic attitudes of individuals
are cancelled out, tie in with something he said in another recent
paper.76 There he noted that even in "science" there is "subjectiv-
ism", since "there is a subjective element in judgments of fact, cold,
light, color, weight, pressure, and everything else that is subject to
human experience", and since "no scientific statement would have
any meaning if it could not be tested by such subjective personal
experience as our experiences of color, pressure, etc." But, he added,
"What saves science from being a planless succession of day-dreams
75 Barry, The Problekm of Human Testimony, 11 AusT. L.J. 314 (1938). ST-
Pmw, op. cit. supra note 56, at 42: "The grounds for believing or disbelieving particu-
lar statements under particular circumstances may be brought under three heads,-
those which affect the power of the witness to speak the truth; those which affect
his will to do so; and those which arise from the nature of the statement itself
and from surrounding circumstances. A man's power to speak the truth depends
upon his knowledge and his power of expression. His knowledge depends partly
on his accuracy of observation, partly on his memory, and partly on his presence
of mind; his power of expression depends on an infinite number of circumstances,
and varies in relation to the subject of which he has to speak. A man's will to
tell the truth depends on his education, his character, his courage, his sense of duty,
his relation to the particular facts as to which he is to testify, his humour for
the moment, as to the presence or absence of which in any particular case it is
often too difficult to form a true opinion."
76 Cohen, Book Review, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1649 (1949).
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is that there are connections among our own and other people's
subjective experiences which are not always too abstruse for human
understanding. Consequently, men, or at least some men, are able
to think about, anticipate, and make conscious use of a world be-
yond the egocentric here-and-now. Such understanding and manipu-
lation go beyond merely subjective impressions .... "
Of course. Some "subjective impressions" can be and are com-
municated, publicized, and made the basis of common, uniform, or
"objective", understandings. 77 But the varying discrepant private
"subjective impressions" of disagreeing witnesses as to what they
saw and heard of, say, an automobile accident two years ago, are
usually so hopelessly "egocentric", so "subjective", that they can-
not be checked against one another in a way even remotely like
that used by scientists when checking their respective "subjective
impressions". A physicist, when conducting an experiment, has
prepared himself to be a witness. He meticulously, and contem-
poraneously records what he observes. Ordinarily, he employs pre-
cision instruments as aids to his observation. Supplied with his
report of his observations, other physicists can repeat the experi-
ments under conditions almost exactly the same. Every effort is
made to allow for the "personal equation". But seldom have the
witnesses at a trial prepared themselves to observe the events con-
cerning which they later testify. They make no contemporaneous
record of their observations, employ no instruments to assist their
observations. Moreover, their observations (of the past event)
which they report in court cannot be repeated by other carefully
prepared observers. What the witnesses saw or heard-the signing
of a will, or the oral statement of a litigant-is not an experiment
which can be substantially repeated.78
Physicists, of course, are not infallible.79 But it is, to say the
least, unwise to conclude that because, usually, their observations
are highly precise, despite the distracting influence of individual
subjective factors,"0 therefore the effects of individual subjective
77 I shall discuss later the meaning of the words "subjective" and "objective".
78 See, e.g., STEPHE, oP. cit. supra note 56, at 28-29, 33-34; MAINE, VmLAGE-
Commumi s 311-312 (4th ed. 1881); WOLTERS, THE EVIDENCE OF OUR SENSES
49-79 (1933); BuRRmL, A TREATISE ON CIRcU msTANTAL EVIDENCE 94 (1868).
79 As to the all-too-human prejudices of even great natural scientists, see FRANx,
FATE AND FRErOm 180-184 (1945).
8O Cohen said in his book, op. cit. supra note 16, at 207: "The belief that
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factors.,on those ordinary observers who testify as witnesses are
equally small, equally subject to correction, and therefore largely
negligible.81
Testimony is an indispensable raw material of decisions in
most litigation. Gross, speaking of witnesses' sense perceptions,
says that to study them "is to study the fundamental conditions" of
the administration of law .... If the perceptions are good, our
judgments may be good; if they are bad, our judgments must -be
bad."8 2 The like is true of the memories of witnesses and the accu-
racy of their narrations in the courtroom. Insofar as the reactions
of the believed witnesses to the actual past facts do not match those
facts, the judicial administration of justice goes sour.
Yet testimony is notoriously fallible, uncertain, unpredictable.
"It would be correct, I think, to say", remarked Sir Frederic Eggles-
ton, a famous-tria-lawyer, "that no witness can be expected to be
more than 60% correct, even if perfectly honest and free from
preconception."'  Said Carter, "From my experience as a man, a
lawyer, a prosecuting attorney, and a judge, I am compelled to say
that the most uncertain thing I know of is human testimony."8 4
Barry writes that "such investigations as have been made support
the view that the usual assumptions of the value of human testi-
men, upon entering a laboratory, are temporarily endowed with infallibility is a
popular myth.... No great scientist is blind to the degree of honest error involved
in physical observation. People-and scientists are people-see to a certain extent
what they want or expect to see .... "
' This point needs high-lighting. It serves to answer as able a thinker as
Jerome Hall who tries to make light of mistakes in trial-court fact-finding due to
witnesses' errors. In his book, Living Lavl of a Democratic Society (1949) he say
(p. 42) that "relevant factual truth can usually be discovered in sufficient degree
for the practical purposes of the legal order"; and he speaks (p. 105) of "the
common sense practical 'certainty'" of the facts in most law suits. This com-
placenck" he apparently justifies by saying (p. 41) that a contrary view (1) ignores
"the absolute assurance of normal persons regarding the correctness of their sense
perceptions" and (2) involves the "ultimate assumption that science is nonsense
because the conditions of correct sense perception are non-existent." On both
points, one wishes he and Cohen would read and reflect on what has been said by
such writers as STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 56, at 28-29; MAINE, VILLAGE-COM-
muNE 311-312 (4th ed. 1891); WOLTERs, THE EVIENCE OF OUR SENsES 49-79
(1933); WIGMTOPE, PIZINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROOF (2d ed. 1931); the works of
Gross supra note 58.
82 GROSS, CRTINIAL PSYCHOLOGY § 35 (1911).
83 Eggleston, Legal Development in a Modern Community, INTERPRETATiON
Or MODER-N LEAL PmLosopr 167, 182 (1947).
84 CARTER, TuE OLD COURT HOUSE 144 (1890).
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mony err on the side of generosity, and that the value ordinarily
assigned to it in courts of law is exaggerated."8 5  "It must be
admitted", said Gross, "that at the present day the value of the
testimony of even a truthful witness is much overrated. The
numberless errors in perceptions derived from the senses, the faults
of memory, the far-reaching differences in human beings as regards
sex, nature, culture, moods of the moment, health, passionate excite-
ment, environment, all these things have so great an effect that we
scarcely ever receive two quite similar accounts of one thing; and
between what people really experience and what they confidently
assert, we find only error heaped on error.""0 Stephen said that,
"according to my observation, the power to tell the truth, which
implies accurate observation, knowledge of the relative importance
of facts, and power of description, properly proportioned to each
other, is much less common than people usually suppose it to be."' 7
One form or another of "lie detectors" may perhaps, in the future,
uncover all perjury, and perhaps, some day, even bias; but no device
can discover witnesses' errors in their original observations.
Since most decisions are at the mercy of the unique, unfore-
seeable, inscrutable, subjectivities of witnesses' reactions, what
price predictable uniformities in decisions?
VII.
If witnesses are not to be likened to scientific observers, no
more are trial judges or jurors, when they are observing the wit-
nesses. As themselves witnesses of the witnesses, those judges and
jurors may make mistakes similar to those of the testifying witnesses:
They may misunderstand, or forget, such testimony. Think of the
effect of inattentiveness alone: If a trial judge or jury fails to ob-
serve the demeanor of a witness testifying to a crucial fact, a sub-
sequent reading of a written transcript of the testimony will be no
cure. (The jury, moreover, seldom has even an opportunity to
read the transcript.) A witness ignored or forgotten is not "psycho-
85 Barry, supra note 75, at 315.
86 GROSS, CRIMIN-AL INVTiGAnoN, Introduction XXV (1907). Otto satirically
describes the dilemma thus: "We learn what happened by ruling out unreliable
testimony; we know what testimony to rule out as unreliable by learning what
happened." Otto, Testimony and Human Nature, 9 J. or CRm. L. & CRn~oLorY
98 (1918).
87 STEP=i, op. cit. supra note 56, at 44.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
HeinOnline  -- 26 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 569 1951
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
logically present"; 8 8 his testimony is "psychologically" absent.
Inattention may, then, mean that an important fact is not compre-
hended; it is therefore out of the case, for all practical purposes.
Yet the "subtraction of a single fact may alter the applicability of
one or more doctrines of substantive law.
' 89
The trial judges or jurors, in passing on the credibility (or lack
of credibility) of the witnesses, are powerfully influenced by their
respective "idiosyncracies and personal prejudices" which are
"inarticulate and unconscious"-but which usually no one can
"ferret out". You may call those prejudices "value standards".
But usually such "value standards" result from deeply hidden
"egocentric distortions", not correlated with "group-enforced value
patterns". One trial judge, without being aware of it, has a strong
bias against a witness because the witness has a pug-nose, or a
facial tic, or wears a bow-tie, or eye-glasses, or has red hair, or is
an Italian, a Mason, a Catholic, or speaks with a southern accent.
Another trial judge, again without being aware of it, may have a
predisposition in favor of any witness having such an appearance
or mannerism. Trial judges, as witness-observers, are not fungible,
and their unique reactions are not negotiable.
Said Josiah Royce, writing of out-of-court individual reactions:
"Oddities of feature or complexion, slight physical variations from
the customary, a strange dress, a scar, a too-steady look, a limp, a
loud or deep voice, any of these peculiarities ... may be, to one,
an object of fascinated curiosity; to another . , an intense irri-
tation, an object of violent antipathy."" Neither a "comparatively
homogeneous outlook" nor a common background or professional
education will wipe out the differences between trial judges in those
prejudices, unknown to the judges themselves because they are at
work far below the level of consciousness. With such varying atti-
tudes towards particular witnesses,9 there can be no substantial
identity of beliefs about the facts of cases and therefore no fore-
seeable uniformities in trial-court decisions.
Occasionally, a trial judge, conscious of one of his antipathies,
88 Cf. KRESCH AND CRUTCHFIELD, THEORY AND PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
9 (1948).
89 Smith, Components of Proof, 51 YALE L. J. 537, 569 (1942).
90 ROYCe, RACE QUESTIONS, PROVINCIrALSM AND OMER AMERICAN PROBLEMS
47-52 (1908).
91 That is, varying "primary" (or "testimonial") inferences.
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reveals it. So we hear from one judge that any witness lies who
has abnormally large ears; other judges regard as lying a witness
who throws back his head, or wipes his hands, or shifts his gaze
rapidly, or blushes, or bites his lips, or taps steadily on his arm-
chair. If such a judge reports of record in deciding a case that he
has used such an absurd rule-of-thumb, he may well be reversed.9"
Seldom, however, does a judge make such a disclosure of record.93
In truth, most of those plus or minus prejudices are sub-threshold,
unknown (as I said) to the trial judge himself. Wherefore, when
they influence his view of the facts, he is not constrained by any
"professional spirit" or "loyalty" to his office. And as, in any
event, those prejudices remain unpublicized, he has no fear that,
through being over-ruled by upper courts because of the impact on
his decisions of those prejudices, he will lose "professional prestige".
Still more obvious is the absence of any such professional restraints
on jurors' prejudices for or against particular witnesses.
Those biases of jurors are undiscoverable, since juries usually
return general verdicts which reveal nothing of what facts the
jurors "found", for in any such verdict there is no express "finding".
No one knows what is the jurors' real belief about the facts, or
whether that belief accords with their verdict-or even whether
the jurors heeded the evidence and formed any belief about the
facts at all: they may have reached their verdict by drawing lots.'4
The only "finding" is an assumed finding-uncommunicated,
"private".
Many decisions by trial judges in juryless cases are equally
opaque: In many jurisdictions, where trial judges are not obliged
to make and publish "findings of fact", the judges enter laconic
judgments minus any explanation; such judgments resemble general
verdicts. What the judge, in such a case, actually believed cannot
be discovered. His finding is then but an assumed finding. In any
92 Cf. Quercia v. United States, 289 U. S. 466, 468 (1933).
93 A trial judge's "estimate of an orally testifying witness' credibility may stem
from the trial judge's application of an absurd rule-of-thumb, such as that when
a witness wipes his hands during his testimony, unquestionably he is lying; but,
unless the judge reveals of record that he used such an irrational test of credibility,
an upper court can do nothing to correct his error." Broadcast Music Co. v.
Havana Madrid Restaurant Corp., 175 F. 2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1949).
q4 See, e.g., Goins v. State, 46 Ohio St. 457, 21 N. E. 476, 482 (1889) ; Tiom'psox,
TRIALs §§ 2601, 2602 (2d ed. 1912); Skidmore v. B. & 0. R. Co., 167 F. 2d 94
(2d Cir. 1948).
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such case, the upper court, if there is an appeal, will, if the record
evidence permits, affirm the decision by assuming (without proof)
that the trial court made an unexpressed finding of fact-grounded
upon a belief in some part of the testimony supporting the assumed
finding-which will justify the decision under a proper legal rule.
So it is that many upper court opinions say: "There was testimony
from which the trial court could reasonably have found that, etc."95
In any such case, for all that anyone knows or can discover, the
trial court had no such finding or belief in mind. Actually the trial
court may have believed witnesses who testified to facts that would
not justify the decision under any conceivable rule. The assumed
finding may therefore be the veriest myth.
Moreover, jurors (even in "special verdicts" or "fact
verdicts"96) never say why they chose to believe one witness rather
than another; very, very seldom does a trial judge, even when he
makes express findings or writes an opinion. When a trial judge
does publish "findings", they are but a report of his belief about
the facts. He may (intentionally or unintentionally) misreport
what he believes, in order to circumvent the precedents-in the
interest of what he deems just, or very occasionally out of other
less praiseworthy motives (induced by bribery or "pull"). No one
except the trial judge knows whether, in his published "findings",
he accurately reports or "fudges" (i.e., distorts) his belief, for no
one else can disprove the accuracy of such a report of an inner
"state of mind".9 7
Accordingly, instead of saying that the facts of a case,
judicially, consist of the belief of the trial judge or jury, we should
say they consist of either an "assumed"or "purported" belief.
The foregoing I think knocks the props out from under Cohen's
notion that from published judicial opinions we can discover the
"value standards" that influence decisions: (1) The witnesses make
95 For instances in which upper courts have said they were assuming the
findings of a jury or trial judge, see United Clay Products Co. v. Linder, 119 F. 2d
4S6 (D. C. Cir. 1941); National Surety Co. v. Lincoln County, 238 Fed. 705
(9th Cir. 1917); United States v. Standard Accident Co., 106 F. 2d 200, 203 (7th
Cir. 1939); Frayne v. Bahto, 137 N. J. L. 109, 57 A. 2d 520 (1948).
96 As to special verdicts, see Skidmore v. B. & 0. R. Co., 167 F. 2d 54 (2d Cir.
1948).
07 As Cohen himself said, in a wholly different context, another person can
seldom disprove an assertion about "one's state of mind." CoHEr, ETMcAr. SysTEMs
AND LEGAL IDEAXs 37 (1933).
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no such disclosures of their "value standards" in evaluating the
events they observed. (2) The trial courts supply virtually no
clues to their "value standards" in evaluating the witnesses; without
such clues, it is usually impossible to formulate knowledge of
"value patterns" in the fact findings of trial courts.
To be sure, sometimes trial judges and jurors have gross
prejudices for or against some kinds of witnesses or litigants,
prejudices so gross that their operations are detectably and pre-
dictibly "patterned"-as, for instance, the prejudice against Negroes
in some parts of the South s But in the mine-run of law suits-
that is, the great bulk of law suits-the prejudices of judges and
jurors for or against particular individual witnesses, have no "large-
scale social" character, and lack uniformity. They are distinctively
individual, unconscious, un-get-at-able.
True, lawyers do sometimes become acquainted with gross
biases of some individual trial judges. As I have said elsewhere:"
"Judge Brown is known as a former railroad lawyer who, fearful
of showing favoritism, leans over backward and is likely to be
unduly hostile to railroads. Judge Green was for years in the
office of the City Corporation Counsel and is very liberal to
municipalities. Judge Blue is markedly puritanical .... Armed
with such information, lawyers try to have (or avoid having) certain
kinds of cases tried before certain judges. Knowledge of that sort
might be called 'rules for decision' by Judges Brown, Green,
Blue .... ,,00 But most of the cases tried before such judges do not
9s Years ago Veblen said that it was an act of supererogation for an employer
to bribe a federal judge in a labor dispute. If that was ever true, it is true no longer.
Doubtless there are still some judges with uncontrolled anti-labor prejudices; there are
also those with uncontrolled pro-labor prejudices. But most judges today manage to
curb anti-or pro-biases of that particular kind.
g9 Frank, What Courts Do In Fact, 26 UL. L. REv. 761, 776 (1932).
100 I also said elsewhere: "The writer believes that it is the function of a lawyer,
if possible, to anticipate, on the basis of past knowledge, that a police magistrate
will exercLse his discretion in accordance with the wishes of a particular politician
who is friendly to opposing counsel, or that, in jurisdictions where justices of the
peace rely for their fees on amounts collected from defendants, there is a likelihood
that such officials will give judgments for plaintiffs. Or that Judge A has a known
animosity to lawyer X which is likely to induce Judge A to decide against the client
of lawyer X. Or that Judge Stupid is poorly educated, and knows and can understand
few rules of law." For "such knowledge as well as knowledge of the" legal rules
"is helpful in guessing or in bringing about specific decisions and therefore, if and
to the e-xtent available, should be acquired by any sane, sensible lawyer." Frank,
Are Judges Human?, 80 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 17, 41-42 (1931).
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evoke those gross and knowable biases; in those cases, many
unknown and unknowable, sub-threshold attitudes influence their
decisions. Moreover, in most jury trials, the operative biases of
the jurors cannot be learned even after the trials end.
What is more, I note again, before a law suit has begun, often
no one knows whether the suit will be tried before a trial judge or
a jury, or who will be the trial judge or the jurors. So that, even
were it possible to know the less gross prejudices of particular
judges or jurors with respect to particular witnesses, that knowledge
would be of no avail in predicting the outcome of many a suit not
yet commenced. 110
Cohen is a sort of "left-wing" member of the "school of
sociological jurisprudence". It is characteristic of this "school" that
it stresses, most desirably, the social aspect of legal rules, but,
most undesirably, at the expense of inattention to the less general,
more individual aspects." 2 Another "left-winger" who, like Cohen,
has a marked interest in ethics, is Jerome Hall. He aims at a
"sociology of law" which "will be a theoretical social science con-
sisting of generalizations regarding social phenomena in so far as
they refer to the contents, purposes, applications and effects of
legal rules."' This "sociology of law" is to be a division of what
Hall calls "integrative jurisprudence", the "ultimate data" of which
he terms a "socio-legal complex". He says that he uses this term
because it "emphasizes that not private, but communicated,
acknowledged, experience is relevant."' 4
His "jurisprudence", like Cohen's, thus shuts out, as irrelevant,
the "private"-the "uncommunicated", and the "unacknowledged"
-impulses and reactions of individual witnesses, trial judges, and
Cohen subsequently said substantially the same. See Cohen, Transcendental Non-
sense and The Functional Approach, 35 CoL. L. REv. 808, 845 (1935). Mr. Justice
Jackson has observed that "choices of tribunal are commonly used by all plaintiffs
to get away from judges who are thought to be unsympathetic, and to get before
judges who are considered more favorable . " Miles v. Illinois Central R. Co.,
315 U. S. 608, 705, 707 (1942).
101 Not only are decisions affected by prejudices for or against witnesses, but
also by those for or against the lawyers and the litigants.
102 Found is sometimes an exception: He has, on occasions, turned his attention
to some of the less general aspects.
103 Hall, Integrative Jurisprudence, INTERPRETATIONS Or MODERN LEGAL PIEL-
osoPmIEs 312, 328 (1947).
104 Id. at 323. I shall later discuss the substitution of "private" for "subjective".
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jurors. Unfortunately, the practical effects of those hidden impulses
and reactions cannot be excluded from trials and trial-court
decisions.' ° A "jurisprudence" that disregards them does not
mesh with the realities in the largest area of court-house govern-
ment-that of the trial courts. Cohen, Hall & Co. agree then, with
Cardozo, that, although what I have described as trial-court "fact-
suits" do "make up the bulk of the business of the courts" and "are
important for the litigants concerned in them", yet the decisions
in these suits lack significance for "jurisprudence" because they
"leave jurisprudence where it stood before", quite "untouched" by
those decisions. 06
Think of it. The "bulk" of cases-admittedly the cases that
most importantly affect most citizens who litigate-must not be
allowed to disturb the legal philosophers who think high thoughts
as they dwell in the serene atmosphere of their "jurisprudence".
The ills of those numerous litigants are ostracized in those sacred
precincts. What an example is set to ordinary lawyers by these
philosophers who, declaring that they dote on ethics, will not soil
their hands by dealing with those ills. These moral-legal phil-
osophers regard the bulk of cases as unworthy of their attention;
they look upon such cases as legal bastards outside the pale of
legitimate high-minded moral concern. If they consider it beneath
their dignity to attend to such matters, who will attend to them?
To my mind, that sort of ethics is dangerously inhumane. It
recalls William James' condemnation, as perniciously immoral,
of "the talk of the contemporary sociological school about averages
and general laws... with its obligatory undervaluing of the import-
ance of individual differences ... .
VIII.
As the words "subjective" and "objective" are ambiguous, I
must, to preclude misunderstanding, outline what I intend by my
use of those words. I do not use "subjective" to mean the "unreal",
1o As to Hall's cavalier way of disposing of witnesses' biases and mistakes,
see note 81 supra.
106 CARDOZO, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 163, 164 (1924). For criticism, in this vein
of Cardozo, with full recognition of the great value of his writings concerning upper
courts, see Frank, Cardozo and TIe Upper-Court Myth, 13 LAw & CoNTEz'P. PROB.
369 (1949).
107 JAmis, The Importance of Individuals, THE WIr TO BELIVE 261-262 (1896).
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or "objective" to mean the "real". By "subjectivity" I designate that
which some persons prefer to label "relativity". 08 Following, in
a general way, the lead of Bertrand Russell, 1 9 I use "subjective"
to designate whatever results from limited, singular, particular,
perspectives. In that sense, "objective" signifies the sum total of
that which would come from all possible perspectives. The "sub-
jective" then is a real but partial, restricted, view. On that basis,
I suggest that men encounter at least the following kinds of
"subjectivities":11°
(1) The subjectivities which stem from the divergent social
heritages of divers social groups, each with its restricted perspective.
(2) The subjectivities due to the grammatical structures of
basically different languages (e.g., the Hopi or Chinese as compared
with the ordinary European-American), each having its restricted
perspective.11
(3) The subjectivities which arise from differences in physical
locations.
(4) The subjectivities which derive from the unique attitudes
and reactions of particular men, their unique individual perspectives.
The first and second (which are somewhat related) can be
eliminated to some considerable extent; perhaps some day they
will completely vanish. The third has already been successfully
eliminated, in part, by modem physics (Einstein)'12 The fourth
is largely unconquerable. It will remain so, unless psychology
develops in ways not now foreseeable. It is this kind which this
paper emphasizes.
(5) There is a fifth kind which must not be confused with
1o8 See, e.g., WEISS, MAN'S FREEDOM 185 (1950): "But relativity is not the
same as subjectivity. Values can vary from context to context and still be
objective .... "
109 RussEL, prosoPHY 154-155 (cf. 129, 133-135) (1927) ; Russell, Introduction
XVIII, LANGE, HISTORY OF MATER=SA .Is (1925).
110 Others would call them different kinds of "relativities".
111 See Worf, Science and Linguistics, HAYAKAWA, LANGUAGE IN ActioN 302
(1940); Worf, Relation of Habitual Thought and Behavior, LANGUAGE, CV-TixE AND
PERSONALITY 75 (1941).
112 Einstein's general relativity theory is actually an anti-relativity theory,
for it seeks to overcome the effects of physical (locational relativity i.e. "Subjectivity").
See EINSmE AND INFELD, THE EVOLuTION OF PHrysics 166, 249 (1938). "Indeed,
it is quite enough to know the results obtained by an observer in one C. S.
[Coordinate System] to know those obtained by an observer in the other ....
The general theory of relativity attempts to formulate physical laws for all C. S."
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the fourth: the subjectivity which comes from the limited, finite,
capacities of all mankind. (Bacon said that men are uniformally
"mad", and Santayana says that all of us are victims of "normal
madness".) As all men share these limitations, they are usually
ignored. We usually consider "objective" that which, at least
potentially, is common to all humans. Yet the finiteness of man
(genus homo) necessarily gives him a restricted (anthropocentric)
perspective,"' which forever bars him from knowing whether, and
how far, his notions-from the crudest notions to the most refined
scientific theories ("laws") -transcend the status of "just so
stories""' when contrasted with what would show up as the totality
113 See FRA i, FATE AND FREEDOm 311-312 (1945): "Man is, inescapably,
shut off from complete understanding of much that goes on in the world, even of
what occurs in that restricted area which he inhabits, to say nothing of events
in the immense areas outside his ken. For man's knowledge of events comes to him
through a limited number of physiological transmitting devices. We refer to them
as the five senses, although the modem biologists say that there are from ten to
twenty (and perhaps more) senses. By ingeniously made instruments, we have
greatly amplified the range of information which we thus receive; and we made up
for our deficiencies, to some extent, by translating impressions received by one
sense organ into terms comprehensible by another. For instance, we cannot see,
yet we now know much about, infra-red rays. Probably some aspects of nature
exist to which no living organism is sensitive. Man lacks sense organs possessed
by other animals, or has them in less adequate form. We have learned, with
difficulty, something of what we call electricity, the electric fish (the 'torpedo') in
all likelihood has an 'electrical sense' which supplies it with far better information
about the electrical characteristics of the universe. How can we be sure that many
animals are not closer to other phases of 'true' reality than we? 'We cannot', said
old Sextus Empiricus, 'ourelves judge between our own impressions and those of
other animals, since we ourselves are involved in the dispute and are therefore
rather in need of a judge than competent to pass judgment ourselves.' We cannot
justifiably 'give our own sense impressions the preference over those of the so-called
irrational animals.' We may say our reason is superior; but our data may be,
and probably are, in some respects comparatively defective. We may increase our
knowledge by inventing more and more instruments for translating into terms of
our sense organs stimuli which they do not directly transmit; but those translations,
like all translations, will be unavoidably defective. Moreover, it is improbable that
we shall ever, even in translated form, become aware of all that happens in the
world about us. 'We are', says Julian Huxley, 'but parochial creatures endowed
with sense organs giving information about the agencies not found in our little
environment .... When we begin trying to quit our anthropocentricity and discover
what the world might be like if we had other organs of the body and mind for
its assaying, we must flounder and bump.' We can never be sure that nature
corresponds to our beliefs about it .... There must, then, be stretches of the unknown,
the behavior of which dribbles in on us constantly with effects we can never know
or calculate."
114 Freud, in a letter written in 1932, observing that his own psychological
theories seem to amount to a "species of mythology," asked Einstein, "But does
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of all perspectives. While lacking "objectivity", because limited,
the products (including emotions as well as cognitions) of this sort
of "subjectivity" are nevertheless real." 5 And they are sufficiently
close to "objectivity" to enable man to survive and function."'
This fifth kind of subjectivity is implicitly acknowledged in
the word "inter-subjective", popular with some philosophers as a
substitute for "objective". It is also implicit in other terminologies.
Thus some persons substitute for "objective", the "public"; and for
"subjective", the "private". "Public" is sometimes employed to
mean that which potentially, among human beings, is completely
communicable without any possibility of misunderstanding; some-
times it is used to mean that which is "commonly observable"." 7
(In this connection, note the relations between the words "common"
and "communicate", and between the words "public" and "publica-
not every science lead ultimately to this-a sort of mythology? Is it otherwise
with your physical science?" Many physicists have, in effect, agreed with this
statement. See e.g., discussion in CAssIRR, THE PROBLEM: OF KNOWLEDGE 104-117
(1950); cf. Santillana, The Development of Rationalism and Empiricism, 2 INTERNAT.
ENCYC. OF UNIFIED SCIErNCES 1, 26, 40, 47 (1941) ; Zilsel, Problems of Empiricism,
id. at 53, 63, 81, 93.
See SuLu.vAN, ASPECTS or SCIENCE, SECOND SERIES 101, 104 (1926): "Men have
believed more than they need have done, and their picture of reality was an
almost ludicrously homely rendering of it, but something was true about their
picture, just as a child's map of Ireland may misrepresent every fact about that
country except that it is an island."
115 In including emotions, I differ sharply from the so-called logical positivists.
116 For a criticism of the logical positivists from this view point, stressing
their infatuation with physics and their neglect of biology, see Jenkins, Logical
Positivism, Critical Idealism, and The Concept of Man, 47 J. or PHaosoPuy 677
(1950).
117 In his book op. cit. supra note 16, Cohen (p. 182) says that "objective"
is usually used to signify "commonly observable". He also says (pp. 204-205) that
even in physics, "we pass from one private world into a common world and beyond
that into another private world" and that often in every day life we manage to
"escape the solipsism of the moment."
GEORGE, TnE SCIENTIST N AcTIoN 113, 248, 285 (1938) writes of the "impersonal"
by which he means the use of those qualities of human observers which are common
to all. Scientific research is "done by using qualities which are common to all men,
though subject to wide quantitative variations in different individuals ... The
basis of science is therefore accessible knowledge", which "is based upon a property
found in practice to be common to all men."
Cf. Zilsel, Problems of Empiricism, 2 INTERNAT. ENCYC. OF UNTNIFIED SCICE 53,
68-69 (1941): "In this business of investigating phenomena, natural scientists are
faced with the task of separating constant relations, on which all observers can
agree, from the variable and unstable aspects which are offered under different
conditions or to different observers in a different way .... This is the sound
basis for the distinction between objects and subjects."
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tion". Note also the interchange of "public" and "common" in
the words "republic" and "commonwealth".)
I shall not here stop to evaluate the several notions summarized
in the preceding paragraph. I happen not to agree with any of them,
because I think all of them too naively anthropocentric. But they
do help to light up this fact: The unique (idiosyncratic, singular,
"private", non-negotiable) attitudes, moods and reactions of any
particular man are obscure, usually undiscoverable by other men.
Since they are hidden, "private", they defy attempts to reduce them
to, or translate them into, knowable uniformities or regularities.
Nevertheless, they are not unreal."" They are real because they
exist. They do not lack reality merely because they are products
of special perspectives-unless one is prepared to say either (a)
that nothing is "real" except the totality of all perspectives or (b)
that the "real" consists of nothing but that on which all human
beings (or some selected human beings) now, or some day may,
agree." 0
There is, too, an embarrassing ambiguity in the word "fact".
"Facts" are both "subjective" and "objective":
(1) Men meet aspects of experience which are tough, stub-
born, which have hard cores completely independent of human
responses to them. So we speak of "brute" or "hard" facts. Mr.
Justice Holmes aptly described them as "Can't Helps", what men
are "up against". Barry refers to them as "coercive" or "compulsive"
experiences, and Kenneth Burke as "the recalcitrance of the
materials" forced upon us in our thinking, feeling, acting. These
"Can't Helps" do not come to us in the raw, for they are to some
extent formed or patterned by our "sense organs", indeed by our
entire organisms; however, as our organisms are not of our own
making, the reports of the "external world" we receive through them
are part of the stubbornness of experience.
(2) But we do not mechanically and fixedly accept those
reports. According to varying human needs and purposes, we go
to work on them, select parts of them, interpret them. A human
fact, as F.C.S. Schiller says, is a "fact-for-a-purpose-in-hand".
Differing human purposes, confronting the same experience, result
118 There are those who disagree, e.g., some of the "logical positivists". For
emphatic statements of their view, see HoGBm, THE NATURE OF LivNG MATTER
cc. x, xi, xii, = (1931).
119 To my mind, (b) is a totalitarian thesis.
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in different "facts". A hammer is not the same fact to a carpenter,
a painter, a poet, a physicist, and a murderer. What men are "up
to" affects their facts. Facts, in that sense, are somewhat "soft",
being valuations of experience which alter with variations in men's
interests. A fact, so regarded, is a selective human interpretation
of-a point of view or attitude concerning, i.e., a theory or generali-
zation about-some of the "Can't Helps". So the line between a
"fact" and a "theory" or generalization is often shadowy: A "fact"
-being a purposive selection or interpretation of some fragment
of human experience-is a kind of "theory" or generalization; a
"theory" or generalization is a kind of "fact". The "theory" that
the earth is flat was once a "fact"; the "theory" that it is round
is now a "fact.1 20
Approached in this way, the word "fact" has many shades of
meaning. I shall not here try to give an exhaustive statement of
all its possible meanings. For present purposes, suffice it to say that
it may mean any one of the following:
(a) An event as it actually occurred in all its aspects, from
every conceivable perspective, i.e., as it would appear to omniscience.
(b) All the limited aspects of that event which mankind-
with its finite, limited capacities and perspective-is potentially
capable of learning.
(c) Those still more limited aspects of that event which some
particular man-with his particular limited perspective and falli-
bilities-actually did learn.' 2'
(d) The report (accurate or inaccurate) made by that man
to others of his recollection (accurate or inaccurate) of what he
learned. (The report may be deliberately false.)
(e) The belief of some other man or men about that report.
(f) That selected portion of (c) or (d) or (e) which is
regarded by some man or men as pertinent-relevant-to some
particular and restricted human purpose.
Apply these several meanings to a "fact" in a law suit: As
the witnesses are mere men, they can never know (a). They do not
reach (b), but at best, only (c). The trial court cannot even reach
(c). It must content itself with learning (d), thus arriving at (e).
120 For a more extensive discussion of this theme, see FRANx, FATE AND FREEDOM,
c. 14 (1945). See also WEiss, MmA's F. DoM 19-22 (1950).
121 "Learn" includes emotions as well as "sense data" and "thought".
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Out of (e), the trial court or upper court, using a legal rule as a
relevance-cutter, carves (f).'-
IX.
I now come to one of the most seductive fallacies of Cohen
& Co. Cohen implies that the "social forces", at any particular time,
have a substantially uniform influence on court decisions. Others
talk of substantial uniformity in the "living law" (which rests on
customs and mores), or in the community's sense of justice (or in-
justice), or in the prevalent social moral attitudes or ideals.
Disregarding the fact that, in our society, there are, as to many
subjects, many warring customs, moral attitudes and ideals, let it
be assumed, arguendo, that such uniformities are both dominant
and knowable. The argument about the effect of such uniformities
usually takes this form: Countless transactions, it is said, are
governed by the "living law"; these transactions never develop into
law suits, never come before the courts; consequently such transac-
tions are not plagued by the uncertainties and unpredictibilities
encountered in litigation. Litigation (so that argument goes) rep-
resents the unusual, the "pathological" or "sick" situations, when
the smooth-running, socially accepted, norms disrupt, and the un-
settled disputes go to the courts, which serve as "hospitals".
But, as this argument itself makes plain, the "living law" does
not affect litigation, except to the extent that a demonstrable cor-
relation exists between (a) the out-of-court regularities and '(b)
what happens in the courts when the "sickness" of litigation breaks
out. Let us assume that a correlation does exist, to a considerable
degree, between the out-of-court regularities and the in-court
regularities we call the legal rules. But then the vital question
becomes this: Do (1) these in-court regularities, the legal rules,
usually bring about anything like (2) regularities in court
decisions?" The answer is No-because of the vagaries of trial
court fact finding.
Assuming now that the out-of-court uniformities are embodied
in the legal rules and reflect community morals or ideals, let us
122 See infra p. 587 for a discussion of the function of a legal rule as a relevance-
guide.
123 Cf. M. R. COHEN, PREPAcE To Looic 133 (1944): "We look for correlations
where we expect a real connection, and then we regard whatever small correlation
we find as proof of our hypothesis."
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approach the problem in terms of morals or ideals. It then appears
that, in fact-finding in particular law suits, those uniformities are
balked by private, un-uniform, moral attitudes. I call them "moral"
for this reason: If the unconscious, subthreshold, individual preju-
dices of particular trial judges or jurors towards particular wit-
nesses (or lawyers or litigants) were consciously entertained and
publicized, they would spell out as moral---or immoral or urgnoral-
attitudes.'24 They would then be open to criticism, and would
perhaps be made to accord with acceptable community attitudes.
But, they are concealed, publicly unscrutinized, uncommunicated.
These secret, unconscious, private, idiosyncratic, "moral" norms or
standards cut across-they fight with and nullify-the influence on
fact-findings of the moral attitudes and ideals of the community
which (we have assumed) are both knowable and uniform. 2 -
Here is a kind of rampant subjectivity ignored by legal
thinkers (like Cohen) who minimize the difficulties of legal criticism
and of prediction of decisions. These thinkers overlook the distinc-
tion between (1) the more or less "objective" (uniform) character
of the norms embodied in the legal rules (whether "paper" or
"real" rules) and, (2) the "subjective" character of the trial
judges' or juries' responses to conflicting oral testimony. Why?
Because those thinkers are thinking of cases in upper courts where
the "facts" are ordinarily those "found" by the trial courts.
X.
Cohen, it will be remembered, says that "professional loyalty
constitutes an effective check upon the exercise of legal dis-
cretion."'"0 In making that statement, he joins in the common
assumption that a court lacks discretion when the applicable
legal rule is well settled and when, by its terms, it confers no
discretion-e.g., the rule that there must be two witnesses to a
will. That assumption is egregiously wrong. Cohen's blithe
acceptance of it accounts for his fundamental error. For no
legal rule whatever is discretion-proof. Let me explain: I
shall for the time being adopt (as Cohen does) the usual
124 These prejudices, note again, influence especially the "primary" or "tes-
timonial" inferences.
125 For more extensive discussion of this point, from several angles, see Fp-&-NK,
CouRTs oN TRTAL cc. 25, 26 (1949).
126 COuEN, EThICAL SYSTEMiS AND LEGAL IDEA S 242 (1933).
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notion that, if a court does its duty, its decision necessarily results
from the application of a rule to the facts of the case. On that
basis, it must be true that, in court, no rule goes into operation
except in its application to an appropriate set of facts. In short,
every rule involves an "if": 2 A rule is a conditional, or "if-then",
statement referring to facts. It says, "If such and such are the
facts, then this legal consequence follows." It says, for instance,
"If a trustee, for his own purposes, uses trust funds, he must
account for the profits", or "If a man, without provocation, kills
another, the killer must be punished." To phrase the "if" more
accurately, a rule says: "If the facts are proved to be thus and so,
etc." Still more accurately phrased, it says: "If the trial judge or
jury believes the facts to be thus and so, etc." To phrase the
matter with complete accuracy, we should recognize that a rule
says: "If the trial judge or jury, in an express finding, reports a
purported belief that such are the facts, etc.", or, "Where there is
no special finding, if there is some substantial (although con-
tradicted) oral testimony which permits the assumption that the
trial judge or jury reasonably believed those to be the facts, etc."
In other words, unless the facts are undisputed, the applica-
tion of a legal rule, no matter how fixed and precise, requires a
trial court's fact-determination-that is, a trial court's purported
or assumed belief about the facts. Whenever the trial court, in
arriving at such a determination, has to pass .on the credibility of
orally testifying witnesses who disagree with one another, the trial
court must make a choice (real or purported) of the witnesses to
be believed. 28
The trial court's choice of witnesses to be believed is nothing
more or less than the exercise of discretion. (So several courts
have explicitly recognized. 2 ) Accordingly, every legal rule confers
discretion on the trial court whenever the facts are in controversy
and the testimony is oral and conflicting.
Only in rare instances does an upper court interfere with a
trial court's exercise of this "fact discretion" (or "credibility
127 This is true not only of the formal rules enunciated by the courts but also
of those to which Cohen recurrently refers, i.e., the rules behind the formal rules.
128 Note that this relates especially to the "primary" or "testimonial" inferences.
1'9 See, e.g., Woey Ho v. United States, 109 Fed. 888, 890 (9th Cir. 1901)
Nash v. Fries, 129 Wis. 120, 108 N. W. 210, 211 (1906).
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discretion").'o This is so for a reason previously canvassed: Since
the upper court judges do not see and hear the orally-testifying
witnesses, they cannot competently review the choice made by the
trial judge or jury of the testimony to be taken as true. Trial court
"fact discretion" is, then, virtually uncontrolled in most suits:
When there is some substantial oral testimony which, if regarded
as true, supports the trial court's explicit or assumed finding of
facts,' 31 the upper court usually accepts that finding, although
there is other substantial contradictory oral testimony which, were
it regarded as true, would upset that finding. Upper-court opinions
often, in one way or another, say: "We ourselves would not have
believed the witnesses on whose testimony the findings are based,
but we must leave judgments of credibility to the trial court." 2
The resultant extensive power of the trial court has been called
its "sovereignty".133
This virtually uncontrolled, and virtually uncontrollable, "fact-
discretion" or "sovereignty" has been overlooked by most legal
thinkers. For instance, Morris Cohen (Felix Cohen's father)
overlooked it when he stated: "Uncontrolled discretion of judges
would make modern complex life unbearable."' 34 He forgot the
"fact discretion" of trial judges, to say nothing of that of juries.
One does not get rid of that discretion by labeling it "unbearable."' 135
130 "Triers of fact in our tribunals are, with rare exceptions, free in the
exercise of their honest judgment, to prefer the testimony of a single witness to that
of many." Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 608 (1945).
131 That is, its purported or assumed "primary" (or "testimonial") inferences.
In the case of the jury, this includes its "derivative" inferences if not irrational.
132 See, e.g, Kind v. Clark, 161 F. 2d 36, 46 (2d Cir. 1947); Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Hamilton, 143 F. 2d 726, 732 (5th Cir. 1944); O'Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F. 2d
50, 56 (2d Cir. 1937). Thus a trial court's finding has been accepted although it
relied on the testimony of a self-confessed perjurer. Fisher v. People, 20 Mich. 135
(1870) ; State v. Horwitz, 108 Conn. 53, 142 Atl. 470 (1928) ; Smith v. Gasper, 55 S.D.
592, 230 N. W. 20 (1930).
For the highly exceptional kind of case where the trial judge believes a witness
whose testimony is obviously absurd especially in the light of undisputed documentary
evidence, see Gindorff v. Prince, 189 F. 2d 877 (2d Cir. 1951).
133 Broadcast Music Co. v. Havana Madrid Restaurant Co., 175 F.2d 77
(2d Cir. 1949); Colby v. Klune, 178 F. 2d 872, 874 (2d Cir. 1949).
For excellent detailed discussion of the extent of this power, see Powell and Wife
v. Streatham Manor, [1935] A. C. 243. See also S. S. Hontestrom v. S. S.
Sagporack [1927] A. C. 37, 47; Watt or Thomas v. Thomas [1947] A. C. 481.
3.4 MoRuS Co N, LAw AND TE SOCIAL ORDER 362 (1933).
135 In another context, Felix Cohen said: "Unfortunate as this state of affairs
may be, we shall not cure it by pretending that it does not exist . " CoEMq,
ETHICAL SYSTEmS ANDW LEcAL IDEALS 64 (1933).
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As this "fact discretion" is exquisitely "unruly", and its
operations inscrutable, "professional loyalty" exerts virtually no
check upon its exercise.136 Yet it must be exercised whenever a
litigant raises a disputed issue of fact and calls witnesses to testify
orally on his behalf.
Pound, then, is in error in stating that some "parts of the
administration of justice... not only prove susceptible of complete
reduction to legal rules, but resist all attempts to deal with them
in any other way", and that, in cases relating to "property" or
"commercial transactions", all discretion is excluded, and decisions
conform to precise legal rules . 38  For in any sort of law suit,
oral testimony, under an appropriate fact-issue, may poke a hole
in any rule. For example, a plaintiff may claim that he received
a deed to land from the defendant but that the deed was lost or
destroyed; the plaintiff may then offer oral testimony on that
issue; if the trial court believes 39 the plaintiff's witnesses-who
may be lying or honestly mistaken-he becomes, by the decision,
the legal owner of the land; the trial court's exercise of its "fact
discretion" is final, even if it is actually mistaken. Again, in a
suit on a written contract, a party may offer oral testimony that,
according to the custom of the trade, the contract is not to be
construed according to the apparent meaning of its words; if the
trial judge or jury thinks 4 ' his witnesses have testified correctly,
the decision is final. Neither the parol evidence rule nor the Statute
of Frauds serves to create immunity from such trial court discre-
tion. 41 Such trial court discretion has been successfully invoked in
almost every conceivable kind of case, including suits on promissory
notes, or patents or copyrights, to establish trusts, for accounting
by trustees. No one is immune from litigation as to any of his
supposed rights; and the decision in any such litigation may be
made to turn entirely on the unforeseeable way a trial judge or a
jury will use "fact discretion".," 2 Unpredictably, then, any man's
W6 Certainly it does not in most jury trials.
13' Pound, Justice According to Law, 13 COL. L. Rrv. 696, 700 (1913).
138 Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decisions, 36 HARv. L. REV. 940, 957ff.
(1022); POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 154-155 (1923).
139 Or purports to believe.
140 Or purports to think.
141 See, e.g., Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53 YALE L. J. 603 (1944).
142 Thomas Aquinas, at least once, recognized the existence of such discretion.
See TmH Suim T3EOLOGICA (Part II, Second Number, Question 70, Art. 2)
(Translated by the Fathers of the Dominican Province, 1929).
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supposed rights may at any time be at the mercy of the unpredict-
able "unruly" elements of the decisional process. 43
XI.
Note once more that the traditional, conventional description
or theory of how courts decide a case is this: The court applies a
legal rule to the facts of the case as those facts are determined by
the court. If we adhere to this theory, it follows that a court in
determining the facts of a case has two tasks: First, the court
must ascertain whether certain events occurred in the past. Second,
from those events thus ascertained, the court must winnow out
that portion (if any) of these events which is "relevant", i.e.,
possesses legal significance in terms of the applicable legal rule.
This second task may be called the "interpretation of the facts".
The first task, when the crucial testimony is oral, is peculiarly
that of the trial court, as it alone, never the upper court, can observe
the witnesses' demeanor. That first task involves the exercise of
the trial court's "fact discretion", which is largely immune from
control by the upper courts. The second task-the "interpretation
of the facts", the culling out of the relevant--can be performed
fully as well by the upper courts, since it necessitates no observation
of the demeanor of the witnesses. 4
However, the trial judge initially performs the first task. He
does not aimlessly gather evidence. The legal rule which he thinks
143 "Fact finding, when a judge sits without a jury and the record consists of
oral testimony, is his responsibility, not that of the upper courts. Only when it is
clear beyond doubt that he has closed his eyes to the evidence, may an upper court
properly ignore his version of the facts. Since his 'finding' of 'facts', responsive
to the testimony, is inherently subjective (i.e., what he actually believes to be the
facts is hidden from scrutiny by others), his concealed disregard of evidence is
always a possibility. An upper court must accept that possibility and must
recognize, too, that such hidden misconduct by a trial judge lies beyond its control.
Only, perhaps, by psycho-analyzing the trial judge could his secret mental operations
be ascertained by us; and we are not skilled in that art, which, at the least, would
require many hours of intensive personal interviews with the judge." LaTouraine
Coffee Co. v. Lorraine Coffee Co., 157 F.2d 115, 119, 123, 124 (2d Cir. 1946)
(dissenting opinion).
144 I have previously noted that the upper court is able to review the
"derivative inferences" of the trial court because those inferences require no
observation of witnesses' demeanor. However, as I also noted, the upper court has
but a limited power to reject a jury's "derivative inferences". But there is no such
limitation on the upper court in deciding what facts are "relevant" in terms of
the applicable legal rule.
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applicable circumscribes the area of his inquiry. It tells him what
to disregard, as not to his purpose, tells him what is and what is not
relevant. It censors out data which, for purposes of that rule, are
not pertinent: They are "impertinent". The rule has a selective
emphasis, a constricting accent. Guided by the rule, the judge
has a focused curiosity. He is supposed to cold-shoulder any
data not within the rule-determined focus. When we say that
evidence is "relevant", we mean that it bears on facts which bring
a substantive legal rule into operation. Note that the word "relevant"
derives from the French word "relever", which means, among other
things, to "lift up, enhance, exalt". Related is the word "relief"
as applied to sculpture, i.e., "the projection from a background"
or the "elevation" above background: The sculptor lifts or elevates
a part of the material, sinking the balance into the background,
submerging it. The legal rule operates somewhat similarly. In
this respect, a substantive legal rule resembles a theory, a con-
ception, an abstraction, or an hypothesis, in other fields of thought.
Like any of them, it is purposive, a "teleological instrument", a
deliberately used blinder or screen or shutter-out of the distracting
(of whatever leads away from the thinker's immediate pursuit),
an inhibitor, a sifting implement, an ignoring device.
Occasionally, the trial judge need not engage in the first
task (i.e., the ascertainment of the past events) because, by
stipulation of the parties, 4 5 the happening of those events is
undisputed or indisputable. Then there is no room for "fact
discretion". Then the judge need engage only in the second task-
selecting the relevant facts. In such a case, if the applicable legal
rule is both well-settled and precise (clear-cut), the second task
becomes easy for the trial court and (if there is an appeal) for the
upper court. So, too, does the prediction of the decision.
When, however, there is no stipulation, and the past events
must be ascertained from oral testimony, the trial court's ascertain-
ment of those events often is (for reasons previously considered)
far from predictable. Nevertheless, in such a case, once the trial
court has given its decision, the upper court's decision, if there is
an appeal, often may be readily foreseeable. For, furnished with
the trial court's finding of the past events, the upper court, in
determining which of those ascertained events are "relevant",
145 Or a demurrer or motion to dismiss.
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occupies a position like that occasionally occupied by a trial court
when the parties have stipulated, i.e., the trial court's performance
of the first task usually has the effect, so far as the upper court is
concerned, of a stipulation which renders indisputable what happened
in the past. There remains for the upper court the second task
only-the selection, or culling out, of those facts which are relevant
in light of the applicable legal rule. 4 '
Here we come to something of the utmost importance in criticiz-
ing the approach of Felix Cohen, et al.: In the majority of law
suits, once the trial judge has performed the first task, the applicable
legal rule is both well settled and clear cut. This means that, in
most cases, if the trial court decisions are appealed, prediction of
the upper court decisions is easy: Those courts will foreseeably
apply a precise rule to facts which are in effect, for those courts,
virtually the same as stipulated facts. Neither the facts 'nor the
legal rule being in doubt, the outcome is obvious. This largely
explains why only a small percentage of trial court decisions are
appealed, and why most such decisions, when appealed, win affir-
mance.
More important for present purposes, it explains why decision-
prediction in general seems easy to legal thinkers who, like Cohen,
concentrate on upper court decisions. These thinkers, treating the
function of trial courts and upper courts as if identical, regard
the decisional process as primarily the second task (i.e., that of
selecting the "relevant" facts in terms of the applicable legal
rule). As a result, they neglect the difficulty of predicting what in
most cases-where the testimony is oral-the trial courts will
"find" to be the past events, those events from which the "relevant"
facts are then selected.
To such thinkers, prediction difficulties are (1) encountered
chiefly in a very small category of cases, those where doubt exists
about the applicable legal rules, and therefore (2) center about
the obstacles to foreseeing what facts the courts in those cases will
pick out as "relevant". In those few cases-variously labelled
"unusual" cases, or "new" cases, or "unprovided" cases, or instances
of "gaps" in the legal rules-the doubt exists either because
146 This is not a wholly accurate statement. For, as previously noted, the
upper court (within limits previously described) may also revise the trial court's
"derivative inferences". To that extent, the upper court may participate in ascertaining
the past events from which the "relevant" facts are selected.
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the pertinent rules have never been settled or because-thanks
to newly emerging social needs or pressures or to altered judicial
views of policy-the upper courts will or are likely to contrive
new or revised legal rules. In any such case, conceded to be ex-
ceptiona decision-prediction requires a prophecy of the new rule
the upper court will formulate. For the new rule provides a new
guide to the relevant facts; facts which were irrelevant under the
old rule are now relevant under the new.
Most legal thinkers-including Felix Cohen, Cardozo, Dickin-
son, Cook, Llewellyn and Levi-when they write of decision-
prediction (or "legal certainty")--deal almost exclusively with
those "unusual", "unprovided" cases. Those thinkers therefore
erroneously write as if the principal obstacle to decision-prediction
consists of the difficulty of foreseeing what the upper courts will
formulate as the new rules in those few exceptional cases.147 Misled
by this astonishing error, these thinkers conclude that legal certainty
is to be measured by te fairly easy predictibility of upper court
decisions in the numerous usual, unexceptional, law suits where
the legal rules are well-settled and precise. As a consequence, these
thinkers complacently announce that legal uncertainty (i.e., un-
predictibility of decisions) is exceptional.
So if we examine carefully Cohen's prediction technique, we
see that it can have but a restricted scope-the prediction of appel-
late decisions of the few "unprovided" or "unusual" cases. Within
that narrow area, that technique does make some considerable
sense: (a) In contriving new rules, the "value attitudes" of judges
are doubtless influential. (b) Sometimes, with study, one can "ferret
out" the "value attitudes" of particular appellate judges. (c)
Knowing those attitudes, one can sometimes predict the new rules
they will contrive in the "unprovided" cases.
But whether a case, as it comes before an appellate court, is
an "unusual" or "unprovided" case depends often on the way the
trial court has "found" the facts: Suppose that there is some oral
testimony by a witness, Sweary, which, if believed by the trial judge,
will lead him to "find" the facts to be such that they do not fit
into any settled legal rule. If he so "finds", he and the upper court
may face the necessity of formulating a new rule. Suppose, how-
ever, that the trial judge does not believe Sweary but, instead, be-
147 This statement will be somewhat qualified later; see section XII infra.
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lieves"4 8 the opposed testimony of another witness, with the result
that the trial judge so "finds" the facts that they are banal, stereo-
typed, and fall within a well settled clear-cut rule. Then the case,
for the trial judge and the upper court, will not be an "unusual"
or "unprovided" case. The "usualness" or "unusualness" of a case
thus frequently turns on the trial courts belief' 49 in one, rather than
another, segment of the conflicting oral testimony.
With the three brief exceptions noted in the earlier sections of
this paper, Cohen never condescends to a study of the distinctive
function of trial courts. Thus, in discussing "legal cause", he refers
to the "standards" which are "applied to the situation","' without
considering how, in any particular case, the court ascertains what
the facts of the situation are. Again, Cohen quotes with approval
from a learned article to the effect that, when a "wrongful act" or
omission has occurred, the solution "depends upon a balancing of
considerations which tend to show that it is, or is not, reasonable
to treat the act as the cause of the harm .... "Ia But how does the
court know that the "act" in question really happened? In all such
cases, unless (by stipulation, a motion to dismiss, or otherwise)
the "act" is an admitted fact, it must be ascertained, usually, at least
in part by a determination of the credibility of orally testifying
witnesses-which requires recourse to trial-court fact-finding, with
all its attendant uncertainties.
This, then, must never be forgotten: Most law suits are, at
least in part, "fact suits", the decisions of which turn on the way
the trial courts exercise their "fact discretion". Even when a trial
court's "findings" yield an "unprovided" case, ordinarily the exercise
of that discretion supplies the material from which, subsequently,
the upper court, in terms of the new rule it enunciates, winnows
the "relevant" facts. Therefore, before the trial, a prediction of the
upper court's decision usually calls for a prediction of what will be
the trial court's "finding" of facts. Prediction even of the legal
rule which the upper court will use can ordinarily not be made apart
from a prediction of the trial court's "finding".
To sum up: (1) Most suits are "fact suits". (2) Even of
those exceptional cases that also involve troublesome questions
148 Or reports that he believes.
149 Or purported belief.
15o 59 YALE L.J. at 253 (emphasis supplied).
151 Id. at 256 (emphasis supplied).
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concerning the applicable legal rule, the great majority are, in part,
"fact suits". (3) In the overwhelming majority of suits, therefore,
prediction of decisions involves, in whole or in part, a prophecy of
the trial judges' or juries' beliefs.52 about the facts. (4) Conse-
quently, seldom can a prediction be successful unless one can foresee
those beliefs. Is that usually possible? If it were, then ordinarily
in most suits the lawyer for one or the other side must be venal,
stupid or crazy.
I have suggested elsewhere"53 "that a lawyer's ability success-
fully to predict a decision varies with the stage at which he is asked
for his opinion: (1) When a client, having just signed a contract,
asks what are his rights thereunder, at that time neither the client
nor the other party to the contract has as yet taken any steps under
the contract. The lawyer's prediction at this stage must include a
hazardous guess as to what each of the parties will do or not do in
the future. Frequently the prediction must be so full of if's as to
be of little practical value. (2) After events have occurred which
give rise to threatened litigation, the client may inquire concerning
the outcome of the suit, if one should be brought: (a) Before the
lawyer has interviewed prospective witnesses, his guess is on a shaky
foundation; (b) after interviewing them, his guess is somewhat
less shaky. But, unless the facts are certain to be agreed upon, the
guess is still dubious. For, if, as is usual, the witnesses are to testify
orally and will disagree about what they saw and heard, seldom can
anyone guess how the trial judge or jury will react to the testimony.
Especially is the guessing wobbly if the lawyer does not know who
the judge will be, should the trial be jury-less; it is still more so, if
there may be a jury trial, since the lawyer cannot know what persons
will compose the jury. (3) After the trial, but before decision, the
lawyer's prophecy may be better. For he is now estimating the re-
action to the testimony of a known trial judge or a known jury,
observed in action in the particular case. Yet, if the testimony was
oral, that guessing is frequently not too easy. (4) After trial and
a decision by the trial court, the guess relates to the outcome of an
appeal, should one be taken. It therefore usually relates solely to
the rules the upper court will apply to the facts as already 'found'
by the trial judge or jury. At this stage, a competent, trained lawyer
can often (not always) predict with accuracy."
152 Or purported beliefs.
153 FRANK, COURTS ON TRiAL 26 (1949).
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Let us, however, suppose that an experienced lawyer could
successfully predict that, in most of certain kinds of cases, where
suit had not yet commenced, the judgments would be for the
plaintiffs. Even so, as he could seldom foretell the approximate
money amounts allowed in those judgments, his prophecies would
have little practical worth. For a client will not often be satisfied
to learn that he will probably get a judgment in his favor ranging
from $10 to $10,000.
XII.
I must now qualify somewhat what I said in the preceding
section: It would be unjust to Cohen, et al., to picture their idea of
prediction-obstacles as wholly restricted to those obstacles which
are met in the "unprovided" cases, i.e., cases where new rules emerge.
For those thinkers take into account another kind of case, one in
which the applicable legal rule is well known but is fuzzy, vague,
unclear in its contours.
In such a case, the "interpretation of the facts"-the picking
out of the "relevant"-is perplexing, and the prediction of the deci-
sion of the trial court or upper court is frequently not too easy, even
if the past events are undisputed or indisputable. In such a case,
the selection of the relevant facts requires an "interpretation of the
legal rule". More, the "interpretation of the rule" affects the "inter-
pretation of the facts"--and vice versa. To put it differently, the
"interpretation" of the rule and its "application" to the relevant
facts overlap. The rule'molds the relevant facts, and the relevant
facts mold the interpretation of the rule. Rules of that kind get
their meaning in their application to the facts; the facts get their
meaning in the applied interpretation of these rules. In that sense,
the rules and the relevant facts cannot be separated neatly from
one another. They fuse, interplay, intertwine, interlace.
An Austrian lawyer, Wurzel, in a treatise published in 1904,
and translated into English in 1917,11' brilliantly pioneered in the
exposition of this sort of interaction of rules and facts. Many
Americans have contributed to this exposition,"5 but surprisingly
154 WURZEL, METUODS oF JURIDICAL THnwrIG (1904) translated and reprinted
in the volume, TnE SciEcE oF LEGAL METHoD 286 (1917).
155 See, e.g., Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CoRNELL L. Q. 17, 23 (1924);
Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L. J. 333 (1933);
Cook, Scientific Method and The Law, 13 A. B. A. J. 303, 308 (1927); Paul, Dobson
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those of them who wrote after 1904 or 1917 have not referred to
Wurzel. Levi's excellent recent volume on "legal reasoning" par-
allels much that Wurzel said; and Felix Cohen's most recent dis-
cussion of this subject contains an idea that closely resembles
Wurzel's notion of a legal concept as a sort of photograph with
fuzzy edges."'0
v. Commissioner: The Strange Ways of Law and Fact, 57 HAv. L. REv. 753 (1944);
LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION To LEGAL REASONING (1949); OERFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALs
IN AMEIRICA 85 (1939); Isaacs, The Law and The Facts, 22 COL. L. REv. 1 (1922);
Morris, Law and Fact, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1303 (1942); GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 270
(1930); DIcKINsoN, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND TH SUPREMACY Or LAW 52-55,
16S-170, 203, 313-319 (1927). Compare Pound, Justice According to Law, 14 COL.
L. REv. 103, 104 (1914) with curious statements in POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE mn
CIVIL CASES 28 (1941). For American discussion ante-dating Wurzel, see THA, A
PRELniNARY TREATisE ON THE LAW OF EvIDENcE 183 if., 249 ff. (1898); Fox, Law
and Fact, 12 HAv. L. REV. 545 (1899); Green, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact,
15 HARV. L. REv. 281 (1901).
150 Wurzel criticizes the assumption that judicial thinking employs exclusively
the logic of "subsumption". According to this logic, says Wurzel, (1) a legal rule or
concept has a fixed, ascertainable meaning; (2) in applying a rule, the judges make
rigid deductions from this fixed meaning; (3) the "facts", also, the judge ascertains
with precision; (4) only if the "facts", thus ascertained with precision, fit into the
class of facts covered by the precise rule, or into one of its precise derivatives logi-
cally deduced from the precise rule, does the judge apply that rule.
But, says Wurzel, legal thinking does not, in truth, limit itself to that sort of
logic. For, he maintains, a legal concept-i.e., a rule-is like a concept used in the
"empirical sciences"; it is not a sharply defined entity, a fixed "schematic repre-
-entation". A legal concept resembles "a photograph with vague and gradually
vanishing outlines." At first it seems clear and distinct, because we "focused merely
on the center, the picture proper." But then we discover that "it is impossible to tell
definitely where the picture proper ends and the mere background begins. Thus every
concept in the empirical sciences has its central image and besides it a zone of tran-
sition gradually vanishing into nothingness."
The lawyer should "realize that [legal] concepts which at first appear very clear
and definite ... turn out to be quite vague." This appears when a legal concept
is extended to cover "boundary cases". When a legal concept is thus applied, the
"process of arriving at a decision" does not consist of "subsumption of phenomena"
under that concept; nor was the result "already comprised in the original content
of the concept. On the contrary, when we called the concept into our consciousness,
we never thought of the boundary cases, we thought only of the most typical cases....
The original concept is merely a thread around which new phenomena, similar but
not alike, are crystallized. . . The process, by which the concept is applied to the
boundary case is not one of analysis, of separating the component parts of the
concept and seeing which of the parts covers the case, but one of synthesis, by
connecting the original concept with a new phenomenon and extending the concept
so as to cover the latter."
This process is interesting because legal thinking strives for precision, but also
"favors the extending process". This process Wurzel calls "projection", i.e, the "ex-
tension of a concept found in formulated law to phenomena which were not originally
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Cohen and others (without so recognizing or acknowledging)
have followed Wurzel in maintaining that the interacting, bilateral,
process-the interweaving of rules *and facts-involves the "value
attitudes" of judges, attitudes which are often socially engendered.167
As undeniably those attitudes do play an important role in this
phase of decision-making, there is wisdom in the assertion that
prediction of decisions will improve if the judges' "value attitudes"
can be discovered.
Yet the limited utility of that discovery for prediction purposes
appears again when we note the following: the interacting oper-
ation, the process of interweaving rules and facts, has to do with
"relevance" as, for present purposes, I have defined it, i.e., the selec-
tion, from the past events already ascertained-principally through
the trial court's evaluation of witnesses' credibility-of some lim-
ited facts which have legal significance in terms of the applicable
legal rules. Now, as we saw, while the determination of past events
through credibility evaluation is (where the testimony is oral) the
unique function of the trial courts,157" the task of thus culling out
the "relevant" facts is not. The upper courts are therefore not
bound by trial court conclusions as to such relevance. Accordingly,
they devote much of their time to their own inter-acting interpre-
tations of both rules and facts; indeed, this task constitutes one
of the most important of upper court functions.
contained in the concept (... not demonstrably a part of the group of images forming
the concept) without at the same time changing the nature of the concept as such."
Because of the nature of "projection", because much legal thinking does not consist
of "subsumption" of "facts" under concepts or rules, there exists a "transition zone
between rules and facts". WURZEL, op. cit. supra note 154.
157 Wurzel says that the grounds for "projection" (i.e., for "deciding whether a
transition phenomena ought to be joined to one or the other concept akin to it")
derive from "value judgments", including ethical, economic, and social attitudes, or"
which the judge is not always fully conscious. It follows that, not infrequently,
"the judge ...has carried into his finding quite as much or more of himself than
he has really discovered from the outside. This shows that he has really done some-
thing quite different from merely establishing facts." For example, the "intention of
the parties" to a business transaction often "did not proceed according to the forms
of the . ..law. The judge will not be able to arrange the facts into one of these
forms, and consequently cannot begin to apply the legal rule by subsuming the facts,
until he has succeeded in reshaping the real facts relating to the intention of the
parties, by utilizing his own attitude towards social life (his business experience, moral
judgments, and the like), in such manner that he gets at last a state of facts fit to
be placed into one of the accepted categories of business transactions." So it is that
the "subject-matters of projection" consist of neither "facts nor ... rules." WURZEL,
op. cit. supra note 154.
1571 See note 146 supra.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 26,
HeinOnline  -- 26 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 594 1951
,October, 19511 MORAL RESPONSIBILITY IN LEGAL CRITICISM
For that reason, studies (including Cohen's) of this kind of
intertwining of rules and facts deal almost entirely with upper
courts. Significantly; Wurzel in his treatise on the subject, frankly
,disregards trials: "We must," he writes, "exclude those cases where
the facts themselves are doubtful and are not ascertained except
in the course of a trial."
XIII.
There is, however, a very different sort of fusion of rules and
facts, one which occurs in trial courts alone, and which Wurzel and
the American writers on the interacting process (including Cohen)
have never considered. A recognition of this sort of fusion in the
trial courts compels a rejection of the conventional theory (which
up to this point I have, with some qualifications, adopted in this
paper) of a court's decision as a product of (1) the application of
a legal rule to (2) the facts of the case. The conventional theory
over-simplifies, artificializes and distorts the actual decisional oper-
ations of trial courts.
For the reaction of a trial court to conflicting oral testimony
frequently does not start with a nice differentiation between rules
and facts, but starts with an unanalyzed, undifferentiated, composite
reaction-a "hunch" or unanalytic "gestalt" (a "whole"). There
is very considerable reason to believe that juries often do not go
beyond such composite (or gestalt) reactions in arriving at their
verdicts.
Much the same has been said of many jury-less trial-judge
decisions. Some trial judges have made it clear that, in jury-less
cases, when they enter judgments without opinions or findings, they
rest content with their unanalyzed gestalts, and that even when
they publish opinions or "findings" of fact, they merely "ration-
alize" their composite reactions, their intuitive "hunches" or
gestalts.11s Such a reaction (as we have seen) is often not analytic,
logical, but a result of the interplay of numerous unconscious atti-
tudes towards the witnesses, the litigants and the lawyers. And any
such reaction of a particular trial judge or gestalt is usually unique,
15s As to the "gestalt" concept, see Koffka, Gestalt, 6 ENcYc. op Soc. SCIENCES
642 (1931) for a statement, with citations, by one of its leading sponsors. The idea
is akin to those of the "functional" anthropologists and of the "institutional"
economists. It needs to be used with caution. I think it has been carried too far,
for instance, in the notion of "patterns of culture" and in that of the completely
"integrated" personality.
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idiosyncratic, unlike that which another trial judge would experi-
ence.
15 9
The trial judge, however, when he publishes an explanation of
his decision, purports to follow the conventional theory and to
become analytic, logical. He "dissociates", separates, the facts
which he "finds" from the legal rule which he purports to apply to
those facts. In that manner, he seeks to justify his decision as a
logical product. But (so we are informed by some eminent trial
judges) a trial judge, in devising his explanation, often works back-
wards: He begins with the decision which-as a consequence of
his intuitive composite reaction-he deems wise or just. He then
so states the facts that, subsumed under an accepted legal rule, they
make that decision appear logical and legally sound.160 It is in
this "rationalizing" effort that there may occur that "fudging" of
the facts-usually unconscious or semi-conscious-to which I
previously referred.
The trial judge's "findings", even if "fudged", will ordinarily
be protected from successful attack on appeal, if the evidence was
oral and conflicting: It will be protected by his "fact discretion",
his "sovereign" right to believe some of the oral testimony and to
disbelieve the rest; for his "finding" will stand up, if it comports
with some substantial portion of the properly received oral testi-
mony, since (as we saw) there is no way by which the upper court
can discover whether he did or did not believe that testimony.
The conventional or logical theory of decision-making, in com-
bination with published findings, may have some paradoxical results.
To illustrate: A trial judge, seeking to effectuate his gestalt, may
make and publish an unconsciously "fudged" finding which, in
terms of a legal rule as he interprets it, justifies his decision in favor
of the plaintiff. Suppose that the upper court interprets that rule
differently. The upper court, accepting the trial judge's finding
(because the testimony was oral),"' applies to the finding that rule
so interpreted-with the result that the upper court decides for the
defendant. Had the trial court correctly anticipated the upper
court's interpretation of the rule, he might have made a different
finding-indeed one that would have necessitated no "fudging"-
159 Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the 'Hunch' in Judicial
Decisions, 14 CORNELL L. Q. 274 (1929).
160 Ibid.
161 That is, accepting at least his "testimonial inferences"
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which would have led to an affirmance of his decision for the plaintiff.
Suppose that, during a trial, while the witnesses are testifying,
the trial judge thinks that a particular substantive legal rule will
be controlling, and that he interprets that rule in some particular
way. With that rule, so interpreted, as his attention-guide, he fixes
his attention primarily on the testimony and demeanor of the wit-
nesses whose testimony bears on the existence or non-existence of
those facts which are distinctly relevant to that rule; for that rule
coaches him to center primarily on that particular testimony. Now
suppose that, when he comes to decide the case, he concludes that
his previous interpretation of that rule was wrong, or that some
markedly different rule governs. The result may well be'that he
has no vivid recollection of the testimony of those witnesses which,
on the basis of his revised notion of the controlling legal rule, is of
crucial importance. If that testimony was not taken down by a
stenographer, the trial judge cannot now put himself in a position
to learn with accuracy that relatively neglected testimony. Even if
the testimony was recorded by a stenographer, the judge, who, on
our supposition, paid little heed to that part of the testimony, which
has now become important, can get at that part only through the
typewritten pages, an obviously inadequate substitute for careful
observation of the demeanor of the witnesses while they were giving
that crucial testimony. What is more, had he been aware, during the
hearing, of the significance of the factual issue which he now first
perceives, he might himself, by his own questioning of those wit-
nesses, have elicited vital testimony which is not now available.
Thus his mistaken notion, during the trial, of the pertinent legal
rule may lead to his serious misapprehension of the facts. If, how-
ever, despite that misapprehension, he makes findings of fact which
can be supported rationally by inferences from some substantial
competent and relevant oral testimony, and if the legal rule he ap-
plies is correct, his finding, if the case is appealed, will ordinarily
be accepted.
Suppose that, during the taking of the testimony, the trial judge
has only a vague, hazy notion of what substantive legal rules are
likely to be applicable. His attention, as a consequence, may lack
focus, so that, when after the evidence is all in, he comes to decide
the case, he may have no crisp recollection of what was said by
those witnesses-and, more important, the demeanor of those wit-
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nesses-who gave that testimony which, on his reflective consider-
ation of the legal rules, now turns out to be peculiarly important.
His fact-finding may, as a result, be seriously defective. Something
of that sort may easily occur in the following circumstances: After
the evidence is in, one of the parties moves to "conform his pleadings
to the proof". Usually, a trial judge will grant such a motion. The
result often is that the moving party has shifted somewhat the
theory of his side of the case, i.e., he is now invoking a legal rule
to which he had not theretofore directed the trial judge's attention.
The judge, seeking to apply this substituted rule, may have diffi-
culty in recollecting the demeanor of the witnesses who gave that
relevant testimony.
Some judges, at least some of the time, have an excessive in-
terest in certain legal rules or doctrines. Far from "fudging" the
facts in order to do what they consider justice, they will, rather, in
their fact-finding, deform the facts-will disregard the individual
aspects of a particular case-in order firmly to establish, or vin-
dicate, or introduce, a pet legal rule. In that way, the rule and the
facts may inter-act undesirably. "In this connection, it is tempting,
but unsound, to classify judges as those who are stimulated pri-
marily by rules-i.e., the general aspects of cases-and those who
are activated primarily by particulars. Such a classification recalls
Maurois' description of the differences between Gladstone and
Disraeli: 'Gladstone liked to choose an abstract principle and from
that to deduce his preferences. Disraeli had a horror of abstract
principles. He liked certain ideas because they appealed to his
imagination. He left to action the care of putting them to the test.
When Disraeli changed his views, he admitted the change and was
ready to appear changeable; Gladstone fastened his constancy to
blades of straw and thought they were planks .... Disraeli, the
doctrinaire, prided himself on being an opportunist; Gladstone,
the opportunist, prided himself on being a doctrinaire.' Whether
such clear-cut differences between those two men actually existed
may be doubted. But assuming that they did, it might be said that
every judge is in part a Gladstone and in part a Disraeli. The
percentage of those components seems to vary from judge to judge
-and even in a particular judge from time to time.' 162
162 Aero Spark Plug Co. v. B. G. Corp., 130 F. 2d 290, 298 n. 26 (2d Cir. 1942)
(concurring opinion).
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Because of the artificialities inhering in the ex post facto, ana-
lytic, logical "rationalizations" of their intuitive "hunches" or
gestalts, some trial judges consider worse than useless any require-
ment that trial judges publish findings of fact.'63 The position of
these judges recalls the old story of the experienced judge who ad-
vised a new incumbent of the trial bench never to give his "reasons"
for his decisions, since his decisions probably would always be right
but his "reasons" would usually be wrong.
Trial judges, when they resent the requirement that they pub-
lish findings of fact, sense the inadequacy of the means of com-
municating, especially in words, the whole of one's unique individual
reactions, and of one's emotional reactions in particular. Those
judges sense the unbridgeable gulf between the writer (or speaker)
and the reader (or listener). They experience "language frus-
tration". Says Loewenberg, "From the cradle to the grave we ex-
perience two antagonistic forces in steady conflict: one, a drive to
reach out to others through sounds-to make a connection across
the deep chasm which separates human beings; the other, the
awareness of how little .. is transmitted to our fellow men. I call
the first speech impulse, ...the urge to speak. I call the second
'language frustration' or 'language distress', meaning all those inner
experiences and responses which the speaker... suffers when he is
conscious that he is unable to express himself so as to be understood
by his fellow men."" 4
Consider now a phase of something previously discussed: When
not required to do otherwise, trial judges announce the great bulk
of their decisions without publishing any findings of fact or any
explanation whatever. When such an unexplained decision is ap-
pealed, the upper court, if the trial judge heard and saw the wit-
nesses, will usually affirm, if any possible combination of legal rules
and of facts (supported by some substantial oral evidence) will
justify the decision. Yet the trial judge may have decided as he
did, not on the basis of that view of the facts which the upper court
imputes to him, but because he applied (1) to a very different view
163 See, e.g., MCCrELLAN, FEDERAL RuLEs OF CRIMiNAL PROCEDURE (Holtzoff ed.
1946).
164 Loewenberg, Speech Impulse and Language Frustration, 8 ETC 110 (1951).
See also Johnson, Speech and Personality 6 ETC 84 (1949). Cf. M. R. Co~m,
A P E AcE To LOGIc 65 (1944): "The ultimate individual, the ultimate particularity,
is inexpressible in words that are repeatable."
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of the facts (2) an incorrect legal rule. His failure to publish his
fact-finding thus causes affirmance of a decision which he would
not have rendered, had he applied the correct rule to what he
believed to be the facts.
Nevertheless, I happen to think that to require the publication
of findings, although it offers no panacea, will do much good, be-
cause the very act of writing down his version of the facts tends
to induce the trial judge carefully to scrutinize and criticize his
motivations, and conscientiously to check his beliefs against the
testimony.165
Since the subject of trial-court gestalts is exceedingly complex,
I shall not explore it here in detail. 6 But those gestalts should not
be ignored. They immeasurably augment the unruliness, the un-
get-at-ability, and therefore the unpredictability, of the decisional
process in trial courts. Almost everything said in this paper about
trial-court fact-finding should be revised by inclusion of the puzzling
gestalt factor.
I should add that I do not mean even to intimate that most
trial judges are less able and conscientious than upper court judges.
The latter have an easier job.
XIV.
Cohen's treatment of individual decisions--decisions in specific,
individual, law suits-gives us the key to his conception of the
proper moral approach to courthouse government: To him, the
true significance of a decision does not consist of its effects upon
the immediate parties to the suit, but of its larger social significance,
its "systematic implications", its place in the formulation of "sys-
tematic knowledge" of "judicial behavior". 67
165 See United States v. Farina, 184 F. 2d 18, 23 (2d Cir. 1950), (dissenting
opinion); United States v. Forness, 125 F.2d 928, 942 (2d Cir. 1942); Davis,
Administrative Findings, Reasons and Stare Decisis, 38 CALI. L. REv. 218, 221, 227
(1950); McAllister, The Big Case, 64 HARV. L. REV. 27, 57 (1951).
1'6 I refer the reader to what I have written elsewhere on the subject. See
FRA, COuR~rs oN TRiAL c. 12 (1949) ; Frank, Say It With Music, 61 HAv. L. REv.
921 (1948).
167 He makes it clear that by such "systematic knowledge" he does not mean
system-making of the sort to which men like Williston have contributed. "The really
creative thinkers of the future", Cohen remarks, "will not devote themselves, in the
manner of Williston, Wigmore, and their fellow masters, ... to the systematic explana-
tion of principles of 'justice' and 'reason' buttressed by 'correct' cases. Creative
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The "systematic knowledge" of the "actual facts of judicial
behavior" that Cohen seeks has, as we saw, to do with the relation
of decisions to the "social forces" that "mold" them. And so he
appraises decisions as "social events with social causes and conse-
quences."" 8 "A decision," he says significantly,'69 "is without sig-
nificance at the moment when it is rendered. Only by probing be-
hind the decisions to the [social] forces 7 ' which it reflects, or
projecting beyond the decision to the lines of its force upon the
future do we come to understand the decision itself."
Of course, those wider aspects of a decision have a significance
that deserves more emphasis and better understanding than it often
receives. But are we to become so engrossed with the past social
causes of a decision and its future general social results, that we
lose sight of its practical consequences to the man who loses a suit
through the trial court's mistaken notion of the facts? Suppose
that, due to such a mistake, a decision in a criminal suit locks up
an innocent man in jail for life, or a decision in a civil suit finan-
cially ruins him. Surely we are morally callous if we say: "Those
consequences have little significance. We must soar above such
immediate, petty, considerations. We want to know the 'systematic
implications' of the decision. We want to 'understand the decision'
by probing behind it to the social forces which produced it and
beyond it to its subsequent importance to society in general."
Cohen declares that "the decision that is 'peculiar' suffers
erosion-unless it represents a new social force, in which case it
ceases to be peculiar." As a precedent, as a possible precedental
ingredient in a future decision, such a decision may be eroded. But
if it derived from a wholly mistaken version of the facts, its evil
effects on the defeated litigant will not, unfortunately, suffer erosion
through the refusal of courts to follow it as a precedent in other
later law-suits: The misery of the innocent man languishing in jail,
or of the man financially ruined by a mistaken civil judgment, will
legal thought will more and more look behind the petty array of 'correct' cases to
the actual facts of judicial behavior.... " See 35 CoL. L. REV. at 883.
The reference to Wigmore is most unfair. If only Cohen had carefully read
Wigrnore's "Principles of Judicial Proof", he would have seen that Wigmore had a
much livelier interest than does Cohen in the "unruly", unsystematic, phases of
judicial activities.
168 35 CoL. L. REv. at 847.
169 Id. at 843.
170 The context shows he means "social forces".
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not be extinguished, regardless of whether the decision, precedent-
wise, is either (a) extinguished or (b) perpetuated (because it
"represents a new social force").
Tragedies caused by decisions flowing from trial courts' fact-
mistakes do indeed have social consequences. The jailing of inno-
cent men, the ruination of others, brought about by such decisions,
ramify socially, for they play havoc with the victims and their
families. Society ought to take a lively interest in those social conse-
quences. But Cohen betrays little or no such interest. His almost
obsessive devotion to the way "social forces" operate in court-house
government makes him almost entirely forgetful of the individual
human beings on whom, via decisions based on spurious facts, those
"forces" horribly impinge. If a person gets in the "path of a prece-
dent" and is destroyed by it because of its application to facts
wrongly "found", Cohen would have us avidly study the path, and
give little heed to the maltreated man.
It must be added, in fairness, that at times Cohen has eloquently
written of the oppressed with warm sympathy,' and, in particular,
of the denial of civil liberties to the lowly.' But his discussions
of decision-prediction contain no reference to such matters: he
treats the two subjects as if unrelated. And, even when he writes
of deprivations of civil liberties, his chief interest is seemingly not
in the plight of particular, individual, deprived men, but in the dire
effect of such individual deprivations on society at large.173
Cohen strives to create a new kind of precedent system, a
system more dynamic than the conventional one. If he succeeds,
we will have a body of "real" rules behind the formal legal rules;
and these rules, now latent but thus made patent, will be more flex-
ible, less static, than the formal rules. They will embody con-
sciously avowed and adaptable social ideals. So far, Cohen's
program is admirable.
However, any system, just because it is a system, must center
171 See Cohen, Science and Politics in Plans for Puerto Rico, 13 J. OF SOCIAL
IssuEs 6 (1947) ; Cohen, Americanizing the White Man, an address before the Second
Inter-American Conference on Indian Life (October 1948).
172 Cohen, Book Review, 56 YALE L. J. 910, 913 (1947).
173 In a recent paper, arguing that "every case affects society," he asks, "What
about the prisoner's wife and children, and their neighbors, and the parties to another
case for which the one just decided will be a precedent?" Cohen, Book Review, 63
HARv. L. REv. 1481, 1483 (1950). But he is speaking of any decision in a criminal
suit-even one correctly decided-not about a decision convicting an innocent man.
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on generalizations, abstractions. Now, to deny the immense worth
of generalizations is absurd. A judiciary that did not keenly appre-
ciate their worth would be uncivilized.174 But that worth has its
limits. No one, so William James told us, can see further into a
generalization than his own knowledge of detail extends. In court-
house government, excessive absorption in the generalizations (old
style or a la Cohen), excessive absorption in tracing or shaping the
"path of precedents", may become perniciously cruel when it induces,
or helps to maintain, inattention to the fate of the individual litigants
who lose specific law-suits through mistaken fact finding.
The generalizations represent the wholesale department of
judicial business; the specific decisions, the retail. For the most
part, the upper courts specialize in the wholesale department, the
trial courts in the retail (i.e., fact-finding). The latter has far more
significance for most citizens who enter our courts as litigants
(whether in civil or criminal suits). Yet Cohen's "legal criticism"
almost completely by-passes the judicial retail activities.
So, too, does his ethical evaluation. He thinks' "that creative
legal thought will more and more look behind the traditionally
accepted principles of 'justice' and 'reason' to appraise in ethical
terms"-what? The way decisions affect individual litigants? No.
Cohen wants to "appraise the social values at stake in any choice
between precedents." Not at all, you will notice, the consequences
to the parties in each suit of the trial court's choice between wit-
nesses, its choice between differing versions of the facts. That is
why Cohen envisions decision-prediction as prediction of the "path
of precedents".
Let us see what that means: Fish v. Fowl, a case relating to the
consideration necessary for the making of a contract, was decided
in 1920. Will it be followed as a precedent in the contract cases of
Brains v. Brawn, and Fox v. Geese, that will come into court in
1952? As Cohen states the prediction problem, the predicter will
be successful if he correctly answers two questions: (1) Assuming
that the court in 1952 will adhere to the 1920 decision as a precedent,
will it regard the facts of that case as sufficiently similar to the
facts of the 1952 cases so that it will give those cases "the same
174 That I am a member of an upper court, largely busy with the generalizations,
suggests that I am not unmindful of their worth.
175 35 COL. L. REv. at 832.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
HeinOnline  -- 26 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 603 1951
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
treatment" as the 1920 case?' 76 (2) Even if the court regards the
facts of that past and those future cases as substantially "similar",




Let us suppose that, with Cohen's assistance, the predicter easily
answers the second question. The rub is in the first question. Cohen
does not perceive the prediction-hurdles the predicter must jump in
answering it: The predicter will come a cropper unless, among
other things, he can foresee what the trial court will believe to be
the facts of the 1952 cases. Unless the predicter can foretell that
belief, he lacks the basis indispensable to a prophesy as to whether
the trial court and the upper court will consider "similar" the 1920
and the 1952 cases. And the predicter cannot foretell the trial court's
belief about the facts of the 1952 cases unless, at a minimum, he
knows-as he certainly does not-that the facts of those cases will
not be disputed, and that the orally testifying witnesses will not
disagree with one another.
Cohen leaves something else out in his ethical appraisal of
the "choice between precedents". Suppose a dishonest judge, in the
case of Bronze v. Silver, takes a bribe to decide in favor of Bronze.
He makes a deliberately dishonest finding of facts. Unnoticed by
the judge, this finding raises a doubt about the properly applicable
rule. On appeal, the upper court, accepting the finding, affirms the
decision, but lays down a new rule." 8 The dishonesty of the trial
judge remains unknown, and the decision in Bronze v. Silver be-
comes a precedent. That, actually, the findings of fact on which
that decision rested were utterly dishonest, in no way impairs its
precedential value, since the dishonesty is unknown. But the same
is true of precedents resting on honest but thoroughly mistaken
trial-court findings of fact.
In short, the actual facts of cases-the actual past events-
have nothing to do with the precedential value of the decisions.
When, then, an upper court, in considering whether a former decision
is so substantially similar to a case now before it that the former
decision is to be used as a precedent, the court does not compare
the actual facts of the two cases, but only the facts as "found" in
176 See, e.g., Id. at 844.
177 Id. at 839.
178 Cf. the many precedents created by the judge who was later found to have
been dishonest in Root Refining Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 169 F.2d 514
(3d Cir. 1948).
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those two cases. In either or both, the trial court may have found
the facts erroneously. That is of no consequence for precedential
purposes.
Absent any fact dispute, a seasoned lawyer ordinarily can pre-
dict the rule the court will use and, accordingly, the decisions. The
cases with which Cohen is most concerned are (as we saw) in the
minority-the relatively few where the applicable rule is in doubt,
because it has never been settled or is fuzzy, or because it is antici-
pated that the judges (for one or more of a variety of reasons) may
modify the rule. Usually the ultimate decision of such an excep-
tional case is not that of the trial court, but of an upper court. This
goes to show (as we saw) that Cohen's thesis relates principally
to upper-court decisions, and that the legal uncertainties at which
he directs his prediction-apparatus are the rule-uncertainties brought
about by such decisions. It may be that Cohen's prediction-
techniques will considerably improve the pr6phesies of upper court
decisions in that kind of case (i.e., where the past events never were
in issue, or, as usual, are not in issue on appeal), although I doubt
whether even such prophesies will ever approach perfection. For,
all else aside, the chance composition of an appellate court (so my
own experience as an appellate judge teaches me) not infrequently
affects the rule the court applies.
More or less unwittingly, Cohen has disclosed that his concern
is with the rule element in the decisional process, and therefore
chiefly with upper-court decisions, so that, perforce, his thesis, so
far as valid, must be restricted to appellate decisions: (1) In 1933,
in his book, he wrote, "Perhaps, a preoccupation with the 'hard
cases' which are sent to appellate courts for review and which alone
fill the bulk of our reports, case-books, and treatises, have seriously
distorted the views ... " of those who have dwelt much on unpre-
dictability.171 (2) In his book he also said: "Law... is a creature
of uniformity, and in the human inadequacies of uniform rules are
to be found the most pervasive of law's limitations."" (3) In 1949,
he wrote that some persons "have denied that there can be any
certainty or objectivity in law, but the most energetic of these,
upon donning judicial robes, has had to profess an appeal to some-
thing more than the uncertainties of his own subjective emotions
170 CoHEN, ETICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS 238 (1933).
180 Id. at 270.
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when he has reversed the decision of a lower court."'' The italicized
words show that Cohen was thinking of the restraint (on the "sub-
jective" factors) imposed by the judicial office on a judge sitting in
an appellate c6urt-where the facts are usually "given" by the trial
court. Typically, Cohen said nothing of the "subjective emotions"
of trial judges and jurors when they engage in fact-finding and
exercise "fact-discretion".
Cognizant (at least semi-consciously) of these "subjective
emotions", operative in trial courts, and of what I've called "fact
discretion", older experienced trial lawyers are bolder than tyros,
less deterred by a seemingly implacable precedent. They know that
they may be able to circumvent such a precedent, that a favorable
trial-court fact-determination may render that precedent inappli-
cable. "After you have been in practice a few years", wrote Henry
Taft, "you will be surprised to find out how many desperate cases
cart be won . . . Speaker Reed once said to me that some of the
notable forensic victories he had were in cases where he had been
advised that success was impossible; and Sir Matthew Hale in the
earlier years of his practice had misgivings about undertaking
causes he believed could not be sustained, but he became less con-
servative when case after case had been decided contrary to his
prediction."'82
If, like Cohen, you focus on upper courts, the trial court is on
the fringes of your vision. The relation between decisions is, for
you, the relation on which upper courts chiefly concentrate-the
relation between the rules applicable to past and present decisions,
in all of which the facts are "given".Y8 3 Your emphasis is, then,
necessarily on generalities, uniformities. 4 But if you focus on trial
courts, then the generalities, the uniformities, are on the fringes.
181 Cohen, Book Review, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1481 (1949) (emphasis supplied).
I suspect that Cohen was here referring to me. For he has elsewhere said that I
have changed my mind about legal uncertainties since I became a judge. See 59
YALE L. J. at 248. If it were important, I think I could show by my writings pub-
lished in the years before 1941 (when I went on the bench) that Cohen's statement is
unfounded. See especially Frank, Are Judges Human? 80 U. oF PA. L. REv. 17, 233
(1931) ; Frank, What Courts Do In Fact, 26 ILL. L. Rrv. 645, 761 (1932) ; Frank,
Mr. Justice Holmes and Non-Euclidean Legal Thinking, 17 Copi=, L. Q. 568 (1932).
See also discussion of those writings in F-ANK, IF MEN WERE ANGErs 276-315 (1942).
182 Quoted by TRAcy, THE SuccEsSFUi PAACTEICE oP LAW 25 (1947).
183 That is, at least to the e-xtent of the "testimonial inferences".
184 As Holmes, J. said, "to generalize is to omit." Donnell v. Herring-Hall-Marvin
Safe Co., 208 U.S. 267, 273 (1908).
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You see them as but one of numerous elements in decision-making;
the other elements, which now occupy the center, are variable,
uncertain, unpredictable.
Xv.
Cohen, as we saw, has scant interest in psychological studies
of the unique personal characteristics of the men who participate
in the making of court decisions. When he says that such studies
have been neither "significant" nor "useful", he means that they
lack significance or utility-for what purpose? For the purpose of
predicting decisions through knowledge of "predictable uniform-
ities". He misses the point: Many such studies, no matter how
glib and superficial, do have significance and utility-precisely in
that they help to show up the frequent absence of predictability as
to the ways of individuals. Were Cohen to take into account the
influences on fact findings, in the mine-run of law suits, of the unique
individual psychological factors affecting the reactions of witnesses,
and of trial judges and jurors as witnesses of witnesses, he would
be obliged to acknowledge that they frustrate his hopes.
He, too, would probably come to acknowledge that our courts,
for the most part, have done too little in the way of avowed "indi-
vidualization" of cases. The stress (at least publicly) has been
altogether too much on the rules and too little on bending those
rules to fit the unique needs of specific litigants. Our courts, to be
sure, have achieved such humane individualization surreptitiously
-through the wide "fact discretion" of trial judges and juries. But
surreptitious methods are neither wholesome nor democratic. Other
legal systems-such as that of ancient Greece and of China-have
done in the open kvhat our courts do furtively.' 83 Instead of smug-
gling discretionary application of rules-to fit individual cases-
into the decisions through the concealed back-door of fact-finding,
we might well revise most of our rules so that they avowedly confer
such discretion. Most rules would then candidly be treated as we
now treat those few rules which, by their express terms, authorize
discretion. Most rules would then be frankly recognized for what
in many cases they actually now are: general guides to be adjusted
to the particular circumstances of each case. The morals of our
courthouse government would be improved tremendously by such
185 FRmx, CouRTs ON TRi.A 378-383 (1949).
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frank, out-in-the-open, practices. For we would be rid of procedures
that smack of something like hypocrisy, practices that pretend to
do one thing and really do another. Even accomplishing good by
stealth can be morally debilitating.18
Pertinent here are some words of William James: "Abstract
rules indeed can help; but they help less in proportion as our intu-
itions are more piercing .... For every real dilemma is in strict
literalness a unique situation; and the exact combination of ideals
realized and ideals disappointed which each decision creates is
always a universe without precedent, and for which no adequate
previous rule exists."'18 7 Pertinent, too, are the remarks of Felix
Cohen's father, Morris Cohen, that "every legal system does vio-
lence to the finer social susceptibilities by its ignoring of individual
differences. Hard and fast rules... make legalism a curse. Hence
the best legal minds always recognize the necessity of equity ...
which comes into play with the sense of justice of the individual
judge."' 88
I have long been advocating more straight-forward judicial
practices frankly addressed to the needs of individual men, and
have been critical of the notion that our courts must usually deal
with human beings "classically" as if each were but an illustration
of an average or type.' I was therefore delighted when recently
Cahn, in his book, The Sense of Injustice, criticized those legal
thinkers who have regarded men "as either a row of identical pegs
on which to hang rights and interests or as mere particular instances
of some conceptualized being called 'Man' . . . ", and when he
added that the "ultimate consumer [of judicial products] will
always be some quite concrete individual."'10 Cahn, appropriately,
turned for support to ancient and modern writers who shared his
interest in the psychology of concrete individual human beings.
Cohen's review of Cahn's' 0' book is revelatory. He writes that
Cahn foolishly objects to the use of abstractions in thinking about
186 Id. at 409-410.
87 JAMES, The Moral Philosopher and Moral Life, TnE WILL To BELEVE 203
(1896).
188 M. R. COHEN, PREFACE TO LOGIC 80 (1944).
189 FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 147 n. 163, 359-360 (1930); Frank,
Say It With Music, 61 HARV. L. REV. 921, 952-953 (1948); FRANK, COURTS ON TRM
132, 168-169, 383-384, 389, 400-401, 409 (1949).
190 CAIN, Tn_ SENSE OF I juscE 2 (1949).
191 Cohen, Book Review, 63 HARv. L. REV. 1481, 1482, 1484 (1950).
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people: "let him consider that we all use abstractions when we
think about anything." This is unfair, for Cahn shows that he
knows full well the need of abstractions. What pretty plainly
irritates Cohen is that, as he says, Cahn is one of the "psychologists
who write on ethics". Since Cahn is not a professional psychologist,
this signifies that Cohen has an antipathy to the exploration of
ethical problems with the aid of all available insights into the ways
in which divers men, as singular individuals, meet the joys and
sorrows of existence. 102 Seemingly, it is this antipathy which leads
Cohen to remark, "like many others to whom modern psychology
has appeared as a startling revelation, the author must need consign
to the ashcans of outworn history all philosophers and jurists who
had the misfortune to write before the discovery of adrenals and
complexes". Again this is most unfair to Cahn, whose book abounds
with reference to ancient thinkers and to psychological factors other
than adrenals and complexes.
More to the point is this: Long before the advent of "modern
psychology", there were many profound writers on ethics who
used insights into the psychology of individuals. Aristotle ad-
monished the student of ethics and government to study psychology.
His Rhetoric, full of psychological wisdom includes sage observa-
tions about the vagaries of judges. It contains a priceless descrip-
tion of young, middle-aged and old men; but Aristotle warns that
he is writing about "men of a given type" and not of any "given
individual because individuals are infinitely various." "None of the
arts", he said, "theorize about individual cases", for that is not
their business, since "individual cases are so infinitely various
that no systematic knowledge about them is possible." He described
what these days we call "hunches", explaining that a decision based
on the hunch of an experienced man may be wiser than a logical
decision by an inexperienced man. Also in Aristotle's writings,
one will find the core of 20th-century "gestalt" psychology.
Montaigne wrote pages on what today we call "psychosomatics"
and the "unconscious"; untiringly, he inquired into the unique
quirks of himself and others; the irrational individual quirks of
102 1 trust no one will think that I believe that the "individual" should be
regarded as separate and apart from society. Such social "nominalism" is pernicious.
See FRANK, COURTS ON TRPtAL 396, 402 (1949) (where I stressed the difference be-
tween such "individualism" and "individuality"). See also FRANK, FATE: D F rEDom
136-139, 211-212, 214-215, 266, 319 n. 21 (1945).
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judges was one of his favorite subjects. Pascal, without so labeling
it, described "rationalization", and masterfully explored the inter-
twinings of "feeling" and "intuition" with "reason". Leibnitz
used the concept of the "unconscious", as later did Schopenhauer.
Francis Bacon, with his "idols of the tribe", spoke often of
how the emotiofis and wishes of an individual deflect his observa-
tions and his capacity for rational judgments. "Numberless are
... the ways, and sometimes inscrutable", he said, "in which the
affections color and affect the understanding"; in a decidedly
"modern" manner he remarked that "a man's disposition and the
secret workings of his mind are better discovered when he is in
trouble than at other times." Sir Thomas Browne said, "Men are
not the same through all divisions of their lives. Time, experience,
self-reflection ...make men to differ from themselves as well as
from other persons"; he advised that a man "should understand
not only the varieties of men, but the variations of himself, and how
many men he hath been." Diderot wrote that "everything, even
among the greatest sons of man, is incomplete, mixed, relative;
everything is possible in the way of contradiction and limits; every
virtue neighbors elements of incongenial alloy; all heroism may
hide points of littleness; all genius has its days of shortened vision."
Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes said: "There is a great world of ideas
we cannot voluntarily recall,--they are outside the limits of the will.
But they sway our conscious thought as the unseen planets influence
the movements of those within the sphere of vision. No man knows
how much he knows--or how many ideas he has-any more than
how many blood globules roll in his veins. Sometimes accident
brings back here and there one, but the mind is full of irrevocable
remembrances and unthinkable thoughts, which take part in all
its judgments as indestructible forces."' 93
"Modern psychology", has made some substantial progress.
But it is not a science, only an art-and still in its infancy or
adolescence. 94 Moreover, too many psychologists share with Cohen
an excessive hankering for uniformities, a hankering which leads to
a shunting off to one side an interest in individuals. The psycho-
analysts as a group proclaim that interest. As David Riesman has
193 DR. 0. W. HOLmES, MEDIcAl ESSAYS 300 (1861).
194 See FRAix, LAw AND THE MODERN MIND 21, 163, 359-360 (1930); FL.Nx,
Cours ox TRiAL 46, 250 n. 7 (1949) ; Roth v. Goldman, 172 F. 2d 788, 790 n. 17
(2d Cir. 1949).
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said somewhere, they "care so much about unimportant people that
they are willing to spend years... listening to the talk of these peo-
ple, to their silences, to their antagonisms."'1941 Yet, it seems that
even some analysts manifest (a la Cohen) a greater desire to work
out "principles" than to meet the needs of their patients. 95 For-
getting what the ancient Greek physicians and Aristotle taught,
they have apparently become unmindful of the precept, "The
physician must generalize the disease and individualize the
patient."" Wanting in empathy for individual patients, some
psychoanalysts compensate "by applying therapeutic rules mech-
anically",197 and publish descriptions of the way those rules
function "in terms of an ideal situation", disregarding the fact that
"what is supposed to happen in theory far too often fails to happen
in prhctice." 19 When a member of their own group said that the
"analyst's own . . . personality can affect the welfare of the
patient", one analyst replied (in a manner somewhat resembling
Cohen's) that such an argument might lead to "nihilism.""' It
has been said of some of them that their "theoretical pre-occupation
makes them oblivious to the immediate reality of their patients,
as well as to the problem of improving... [their] procedures." 00
Of such all-too-human failings of some psychologists we must
beware; and we must take note, too, that disagreement is rife among
the "schools" of psychology. Yet this much is clear: the wiser
psychologists, as a result of patient and devoted study of individuals,
have discovered (or rediscovered) to what a large extent each
human being is unique. To such psychologists the legal profession
should give heed. For the jobs of lawyers and judges are basically
psychological; at every turn, they must try, as best they can, to
understand what motivates the varieties of individual men, what
((goes on in their minds." An ethical approach to our daily legal
tasks as lawyers and judges entails penetrating psychological in-
sights into the behavior of individuals, ourselves as well as others.
104' "Psychoanalysis . . . would seem to carry a principle of mercy into dark
regions which for long ages had only groaned under judgment." London Times, Sept.
21, 1951, Lit. Supp., p. 597.
195 Blumberg, Does Psychoanalysis Cure? 5 CO mENTARY 487 (1950).
100 DR. 0. W. HoLxEs, MEDicAL ESSAYS 275 (1861).
107 Blumberg, supra note 195, at 493.
198 Id. at 493.
19D Id. at 491.
200 Ibid.
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Much irrationality will be revealed as we seek such insights. Never-
theless, the effort to gain them is not (as some charge) a symptom
of devotion to the irrational. "No paradox of modern thought is
more tragic than this, that the discovery and analysis of the un-
conscious, which is a triumph of conscious intelligence, should come
to be viewed as a humiliation of intelligence, a reason for idolizing
the dark powers." '' Enlightened trial judges will not be afraid to
acknowledge that those "dark powers" exist; those judges will
avail themselves of all promising aids, offered by the psychologists,
to deep understandings of individual human beings," 1 while recog-
nizing that such understandings can never be perfect.201b
That I have used the word "behavior" betokens no belief in
"behavioristic psychology", which I think both naive and dog-
matically deterministic." 2 But I do protest against the fashion,
followed by Cohen, of lumping together, under the label "belly-
ache theory", or the like,"' all suggestions that "subjective emo-
tions" do influence decisions. It is ridiculous, of course, to think that
decisions are merely or chiefly a function of the judges' state of
digestion or indigestion. Rational as well as non-rational factors
affect decisions; and most of the non-rational factors are not
alimentary. However, the digestive conditions of a witness, a
judge or a juror, may sometimes have consequences: a bad night's
sleep, caused by a "belly-ache", may diminish his attention, distort
his observations, or weaken his memory.
XVI.
Cohen makes much of a "scientific approach" to the study of
the behavior of courts. How "scientific" is he in refusing to study
the uncertain elements which make his theory untenable? If he
were rigorously "scientific", he would ask whether by his techniques,
even when perfected, it will ever be possible to predict the reactions
of an individual trial judge ;r some individual jurors to witnesses
201 MULLER, SCrENCE AND CRITICISM 149 (1943).
2016 See Frank, Both Ends Against The Middle, 100 U. oF PA. L. REV. 20, 37-40,
44-45 (1951).
201b They can probably be better than the lawyers' or laymen's understandings
of trial judges or jurors ever will be, since (as previously explained) judges and
jurors cannot be (and probably never will be) subjected to similar probings.
202 See Frank, Are Judges Human? S0 U. OF PA. L. REV. 17, 233 (1931);
FRANx, COURTS ON TRIAL 159-161 (1949).
203 Others use similar labels, such as "gastronomical jurisprudence".
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who have never been seen or heard by the particular judge or
by those particular jurors, in an ordinary every-day "fact suit"
involving no dramatic issues (i.e., not a case of rape or murder, or
one stimulating racial prejudices, or relating to labor unions or to
a rich man versus a poor one, etc.).
In his 1950 paper, presumably to justify his refusal to con-
sider the unpredictable particular elements in such a case, Cohen
purports to be "scientific" by resorting to the analogy of a concept
which has been fruitful in modern physics, the concept of a "field".
To explain the behavior of individual electrical "charges" or
"particles", Maxwell, one of the greatest 19th century physicists,
contrived this concept of a "field" of "forces". Cohen believes that
this idea, applied to judicial behavior, will help to predict specific
court decisions. He begins his 1950 paper-entitled Field Theory
and Judicial Logic-by quoting the following comment by Einstein
and Infeld about Maxwell's "field" concept :204 "A new concept
appears in physics, the most important since Newtdn's time: the
field. It needed a great scientific imagination to realize that it is
not the charges nor the particles but the field in the space between
the charges and the particles which is essential for the description
of physical phenomena." As Cohen also quotes Kurt Lewin,"
who has most enthusiastically exploited this "field" concept in
psychology, it will repay us to summarize Lewin's views of the
prediction of the conduct of particular individuals.' °0
Lewin contrasts "Aristotelian" physics and "modern" physics.
For Aristotle's physics, says Lewin, the "memberhip in a given class
was of critical importance." Consequently, what did not fit into
a class was "exceptional", and therefore not "lawful", i.e., did not
behave according to, was not "governed by", a "law" of physics.
To Aristotle, that which occurred always or frequently was "lawful";
that which occurred "only once" was not "lawful" but a matter of
chance. The individual event, being unique, was thus "unlawful",
i.e., not "governed by law". Science could not cope with it. It
followed that there could be no science of the unique, the single
event, the individual. This "Aristotelian" concept of scientific
"lawfulness", says Lewin, had a "quasi-statistical character." It
204 EINSTEIN AND INFEID, THE EVOLuToi Or PHYSICS 259 (1938).
20.5 59 YALE L. J. at 250.
2111 Lrumq, A DY'Nac THEORY OF PERSONALITY (1935); LEwiN, PRINCIPLES
or TOPOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY (1936).
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rested on numerical frequency (or averages) and excluded the
"infrequent" or the "particular event". But, says Lewin, "modern
physics" regards every particular, concrete, individual event as
"lawful", i.e., explicable in terms of, or governed by, "laws".
Modern physics is "quantitatively exact, and pure mathematical,
functional relations now take the place" of classifications based on
characteristics common to membership in a class. It rejects "the
spirit of statistics founded on frequency." Every particular event
is now deemed "lawful", and "the concept of lawfulness has been
detached from that of regularity." "Modern" physics, says Lewin,
insists on the "complete absence of exceptions" but does not equate
that absence with frequency of occurrence. Its aim is to "predict
individual cases."
Now, Lewin continues, psychology is still largely like Aristo-
telian physics. It must take on the methods of modern physics.
It must regard individuals in terms of functional relations; it
must envisage an individual's behavior as a function of a "field"
of "psychical forces". Lewin, taking over from modern mathematical
physics the study of the non-metrical aspects of space, called
"topology", proposes a "psychological topology". The "totality
of facts which determine the behavior of an individual at a certain
moment" is his psychological "life space". The "life space" includes
the individual person and his "psychological environment". By
discovering his "life space", psychology can "explain the behavior
of a certain person at a certain time"-and thereby can predict that
behavior. This it can do by learning the "mutual relations of the
factors in a concrete situation,.., the momentary condition of the
individual and the structure of the psychological situation." It
can, so Lewin maintains, thus answer this question, "Why, in a
given momentary situation, that is, with a given person (P) in
a certain state and in a certain environment (E), does precisely
this behavior (B) result? The problem is to represent, the behavior
(event) as a function of the momentary total situation
[B = f/ (PE)]."
Here, on the basis of an analogy borrowed from "modern
physics", is a promise that the conduct of a particular man, at a
particular moment, can be nicely predicted. To Cohen, this
promise and this method of fulfilling it are most attractive. He
not only cites Lewin with approval, but he exploits Lewin's notion
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
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of a "life space". Speaking of the necessity, in predicting decisions,
of an "exploration of group-enforced value patterns", Cohen says
that "such an exploration might indicate how it happens that when
anybody enters the life space of a public office, bringing to it a
certain momentum and energy, the life space of his office will
impose its geodesics upon him .... Just so, the man who dons the
judicial robe... finds that the pressure of his office space compels
him to follow paths that, from outside the office-space, once appeared
absurd 207 And, in his discussion of the "paths" of precedents, he
adopts Lewin's conception of a "topological psychology".
20 8
The "field" idea, even in physics, is an analogy or metaphor 09
I do not suggest that, on that account, we should undervalue it,
since analogical or metaphorical thinking is essential.210 But meta-
phors, used incautiously, become thought-snares .2 " The carry-
over into the study of human behavior of any metaphor from
physics, without many qualifications, has its obvious dangers, for
the metaphor may easily mislead when so transplanted in a different
thought-area. Such transplanting of the "field" metaphor is
especially to be distrusted, since a leading physicist-philosopher,
Bridgman, has warned of some marked defects of the "field"
concept which have appeared in physics itself. -2
But forget those cautions, for the time being. Even if one
agrees with Lewin's interpretation both of Aristotle's physics
and of "modern" physics, one may well doubt whether Lewin or
207 59 YALE L.J. at 251.
208 For a thorough-going exposition of "topological psychology", see BRoWN,
PSYCHOLOGy AND = SOciAL ORDER (1936). Cohen's 1950 paper sounds much like
Brown's book adapted to thinking about the judicial process.
209 "Faraday's suggestion of lines ... of forces ... was a metaphor" which was
"justified in its day by the fruitful analogies to which it led." M. R, CoHEM, A
PREFACE TO LoGic 84 (1944).
210 To "eliminate all metaphors is impossible." They are "necessary for the
apprehension and communication of new ideas." Id. at 83.
211 We must note not only "the power" but also "the snares of metaphorical
illumination in science." Id. at 84. See, e.g., Pfeiffer, Brains and Calculating Machines,
19 Am. SCHOLAR 21, 30 (1950): To say "the brain is like a calculating machine"
is not the same as saying "the brain is a calculating machine." "The first sentence
is a simile, the second a metaphor. And metaphors are bad science." This attempted
rejection of metaphors in science, however, I believe, is unsound.
212 See BRmG AN, THE Loic or MODERN PHrsics 56-59, 136-137, 145-147
(1927); cf. DAUNT, ELECTROxS iN Ac'rioN 50-56 (1946). See article by O'Neill, Science
Editor, in New York Herald Tribune, Dec. 3, 1950 for late news about the neutron
which has been visualized "as an introverted charged particle, one that turned its
field inside itself."
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Cohen or their followers will ever be able, in most instances, to
predict, by any scientific "laws", the particular conduct of most
particular men at particular moments. The variables are altogether
too numerous. Lewin, himself, acknowledged that, even with the
physical and social environment identical, the "psychological situa-
tion" may nevertheless be "fundamentally different .. for men of
different personality" and "even for the same man in different
conditions". More, he admitted that "alien influences", "influences
from outside" the "psychological life space", introduce serious
obstacles to prediction. As two of Lewin's disciples say,21 such
an achievement as Lewin seems to promise is possible "only insofar
as we can exclude the intruding effects of alien factors ...
These alien factors . . . throw askew all our predictions based
upon our analysis of [a man's] psychological field." Psycholo-
gists cannot "make complete predictions about the future behavior
of the individual unless the alien factors can also be predicted.
That is the reason that psychologists cannot be expected to provide
concrete predictions; all that they can do is to provide conditional
predictions, i.e., if such and such conditions prevail, the person will
do so and so. The prediction of whether or not such conditions
are likely to prevail is not the task of the psychologist, but of the
doctor, the economist, the sociologist, the biologist, etc." '  In
213 KRICH AND CRUTCHFIELD, THEORY AND PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
39 (1948) (emphasis supplied).
214 Even Brown, op. cit. supra note 208, at 299, 300, 472, a more ardent advocate
of the "field" analogy, writes: "For purposes of exact prediction one must characterize
field-theoretically the whole personality of the individual. One must know the
distribution of forces, the reality dimension of the field in which his locomotion is
occurring, and the structure of the person. For a really precise sociology, this would
also be necessary. But for many problems, such as the macroproblems of sociology....
we can treat individuals as point-regions. Consequently, at the present time a
scientific sociology may be easier of accomplishment than a scientific psychology....
But the physicist has a great advantage over the psychologist in that he can isolate
and control many variables in experiment, and hence build approximate theories in
terms of part-to-part causality. The psychologist's manipulatory powers are much
more limited than those of the physicist . . . [who] is able to metricize his forces,
i.e., he is able to assign a fundamental measurement to them, while the psychologist
must for the present deal with his forces non-metrically." Happily, however, Eays
Brown, op. cit. supra note 208, at 48-49, 476, "modern mathematics comes to our
rescue" with topology which "investigates the non-metrical aspects of space,
particularly the connections between different spatial regions." It "gives us the mathe-
matics to set up theories about psychological problems, where fundamental measure-
ment is impossible at the present time .... With topology, geometry becomes truly
the science of positional relationships. . .. For psychological purposes, one might
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other words, one needs an unattainable store of knowledge to make
such a concrete prediction. One must, then, still agree with Aristotle
that there can be no "science" of the unique, the individual.'I
Accepting still for the moment the legitimacy of borrowing the
"field" analogy from physics, we can discern that Lewin's thesis
has an even more serious blemish (and one which Cohen's thesis
shares). It disregards a striking characteristic of recent physics,
a characteristic which differentiates it from Newtonian or "classical"
physics,"'0 i.e., the fact that, so far as the physicist can tell, the
individual physical particles are "lawless", unpredictable in their
behavior. They do not behave with regularity, but in random
fashion. As a consequence, most of the "laws" of modern, post-
classical physics are "crowd laws" i.e., formulations of the statisti-
cal average behavior of huge numbers of those individual particles.
Interestingly enough, it was Maxwell, contriver of the "field"
concept,'217 who first began to call attention to the significance of,
the unforeseeable conduct of those particles. He remarked on
the unique, iiddividual, disjunctive aspects of experience, and
referred to the "singular points" of existence, the points where
equations do not fit. At a "singular point", he thought, influences
that usually are negligible may assume a dominant importance.
There was need, he said, for more "study of the singularities and
instabilities, rather than the continuities and stabilities of things.7218
He stated that "the limit of our faculties forces us to abandon the
exact history of each atom and to be content with estimating the
average condition of a group of atoms."21 This would require,
he noted, the acceptance of the "existence of a certain kind of
contingency as a self-evident truth." Criticizing the ideas of his-
torians, like Buckle, who were trying to establish a science of
history by using statistical averages, Maxwell urged that they
define topology as the science which investigates the 'belongingness' of spatial regions,
and then connectively with other regions." Brown apparently believes that, in the
future, psychology will become metrical.
215 "The logic of universals-the only basis that a machine can be constructed
on-leads to the prediction of universals but never to a prediction of a single whole
particular". For " ...an event in its fullness can never be predicted." RANsom, GOD
WITHouT THUNDER 239 (1930).
211 Lewin calls it "post-Gallilean physics".
217 He expanded Faraday's metaphor.
218 Quoted by SULLIVAN, ASPECTS Or ScIniNcE 47-48 (1926).
219 "The conception of a statistical knowledge of nature was first clearly enun-
ciated by Maxwell. .. " M. R. CoHNs, A PREFACE TO LorIc 139 (1944).
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should consider "instability", since "it is manifest that the existence
of unstable conditions renders impossible the prediction of future
events, if our knowledge of the present state is only approximate
and not accurate.1
220
The later development of physics has confirmed these remarks.
Einstein and Infeld, like many other modern physicists, tell us
that "we cannot foretell the course of a single electron", that its
future course is unknowable; that today physicists say, "We care
nothing for individuals"; that there "is not the slightest trace of a
law governing their individual behavior."
22
The physicist Irving Langmuir said a few years ago222 that
many physical phenomena are "subject to the laws of chance"
and therefore unpredictable. He observed that the "classical"
physicist discovered clean-cut invariable "laws" because he "nat-
urally chose as the subjects for his studies those fields which
promised greatest success in his hunt for those laws", and accom-
plished his purpose "by working with phenomena which depended
upon the behavior of enormous numbers of atoms rather than
upon individual atoms"; in that way, the effects produced by
individual atoms averaged out, became imperceptible, were dis-
regarded-and smooth "laws" resulted.
It seems clear, then, that "post-classical" modern physics is
no more capable than "Aristotelian physics" of predicting the
behavior of individual particles. The trouble with Lewin, Cohen,
et al., is that they have not sufficiently allowed for recent changes in
the conceptions of physicists. To men like Lewin and Cohen, one
may perhaps apply Bertrand Russell's comment on psychologists-
that they "are apt to assume an old-fashioned physics which make
their problems look easier than they are. 223
If, following the dubious example of Lewin and Cohen, we
220 For fuller quotations of these remarks, see FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM 150,
156 (1945); Frank, Book Review, 15 U. oF Cm. L. REv. 462, 470 (1948).
221 EINsTEI AND I-NELD, THE EvoLUTIoN OF PYsIcs 297-300 (1938). However,
there is a basic difference between Einstein and some other eminent physicists (such
as Schroedinger and Langmuir). The latter, unlike Einstein, do not accept the notion
of "absolute causality" behind the random movements of the individual particles.
See FRANx, FATE AND FREEDOM 148 ff. (1945). As to Einstein's recent attempt through
a "unitary field theory", to eliminate the obstacles to his theoretic notion of "reality",
see Infeld, On Einsten's New Theory, 19 AM. SCHOLAR 423 (1950).
222 Langrmuir, Science, Common Sense and Decency, 43 SCIENCE NEws LETTER
3 (1943).
223 ussELL, ANArYsIs OF MAnrmR 138 (1927).
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borrow the "field" metaphor from physics, we will conclude that
it will not enable us to predict what individual trial judges or
juries will do. Rather we will say that the reaction to the experience
at a trial of such a judge or jury, in an ordinary suit, resembles
a single electron whose future course "we cannot foretell", and that
such a suit is usually in an "unstable condition" which renders
prediction of its outcome impossible.
Even so ardent an exploiter of the "field" analogy as Brown,
concedes, for a moment, that developments in physics compel a
doubt about the ability to predict perfectly an individual man's
behavior. "The realization that strict dynamic causality or predic-
tability does not exist in certain microphysical processes raises the
doubt", he says. "Since certain such processes are undoubtedly
involved in brain physiology, we may say that the chances are that
we shall never be able to predict every 'act of choice' of humans";2 24
and he notes that "operationally there is no difference between
'free' and unpredictable behavior."'2 What, then, of the ability
to predict the "act of choice" when a trial judge or jury exercises
"fact discretion", the choice to believe one witness rather than
another?
But we need not rely on modern physics and physicists in
reaching the conclusion that there is unpredictable indeterminacy
in human reactions. The physical analogy should not lead us to
regard men as mere physical particles. If we do so, we adopt a
bleak view of human life. Individual men have individual human
initiatives, spontaneities which bring about unexpected, unantici-
patable, diverse un-uniform responses to identical experiences.
Of course, all the responses of any man do not always escape
prediction. As Weiss says, "The acts and ways of men are to some
extent predictable .... A man beyond the reach of all prediction
would have to break every pattern, including the pattern of break-
ing patterns .... All of us can be counted on to some extent....
But no one is... completely predictable.... No matter how com-
prehensive and detailed science may be, it will never enable us to
know fully the nature and acts of men.... They are not merely
beyond the reach of the sciences we now have; they are beyond the
reach of an absolutely perfect, and ideal science . .. Predictions
224 BROWN, op. cit. supra note 208, at 336.
225 Id. at 335 (emphasis supplied).
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refer to generalized, classified, abstract situations, . .. whereas
what happens is specific, concrete, the product of unduplicable,
definite, temporal activities, ...making concrete what before was
only possible. All attempts to say exactly what will be are blocked
by the fact that what will happen is more concrete and detailed
than any prediction could possibly say .... We cannot in advance
tell just what concrete results will be produced, not because our
minds are too weak but because those results have no concrete
natures to be known in advance of their occurrence. 228
Cohen quotes Lewin with approval. Yet, unlike Lewin, Cohen
is apparently unwilling to abandon averages in the quest of in-
dividual decision-prediction. And many persons who agree with
Cohen about decision-prediction have avidly seized on the analogy
of the modern physicists' average or "crowd laws". These persons
think that, by looking at a multitude of court decisions, we can
obtain averages, so that most of the differences between decisions
of divers specific law suits will wash out; regularities or uniformities
then can be discovered, and predictions of specific future decisions
will be possible. But that would be true only if the persons con-
structing the average knew at least this: The relation between
(1) the actual past facts of each law suit, the decision of which
went into the average, and (2) the facts as "found" by the trial
court in each such case. No one, however, can know (1) and there-
fore no one can ascertain its relation to (2). Moreover, in the
usual trial, the "average" factors-the regularities or uniformities
-mingle with the unpredictable, unknowable, non-average, reactions
to the oral testimony of the trial judge or jury, and balk prediction
of the decision.
The method of averages is, of course, related to the mathema-
tical theory of probability. In 1877, Jevons, in his Principles of
Science, wrote: "Attempts to apply the theory of probability to
the results of judicial proceedings have proved of little value,
simply because the conditions are far too intricate." He quoted
La Place who earlier had said, "all the emotions, the most diverse
interests and circumstances, complicate questions relating to such
a subject, to the point where [in terms of probable decisions] they
are almost always insoluble." Jevons continued, "Men acting on a
jury or giving evidence before a court, are subject to so many com-
226 WEIss, MAN's FREEDOr 3-5 (1950).
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plex influences that no mathematical formulas can be framed to
express the real conditions." As to judges and jurymen, he remarked
that "there are subtle effects of character and manner and strength
of mind which defy analysis. 22
Cohen should not need to be reminded of the inutility of statis-
tical averages in trying to foresee particular decisions. For his
father, M. R. Cohen, had said' s that a "statistical law" does "not
enable us to predict individual instances"; that such "laws apply
not to individual instances but only to large groups over a long
run"; that "while events .. are individualized, ...statistics are
concerned with the fungible aspects of things"; and that "no
number of rules .. .can exhaustively determine the fulness of
individual existence."
Before lawyers fall for individual predictions by statistics,
they should consider the case of the social psychologists: Zestful to
prophesy the behavior of individuals, many of these psychologists
have made themselves masters of statistical techniques. But in per-
sonnel work, and elsewhere, they have not succeeded in their aim
of foreseeing what an individual person will do in particular future
situations, because of the baffling number of variable, unforeseeable
factors.
2 21
Fascinated by the successful employment of modern mathe-
matics in the physical sciences, Cohen (paraphrasing Plato) writes
hopefully of the day when "mathematicians become lawyers or
227 JEvoNs, TH PRINCWPLES or ScIENcE 215-216 (2d ed. 1924). See also Neurath,
Foundations of the Soco Sciences, 1 ENcYc. OF UNrn' SCIENCE 28 (1944).
22S M. R. Com, A PREFACE TO LOGIC 130, 131, 144, 149, 150 (1944).
2-29 See, e.g., HORST, PREDICTION Or PERSONAL ADjsTMAENT 83, 243, 244, 245
(1945): "The main problem in dealing with the analytical formulations of so-called
dynamic and configurational phenomena is not the setting up of the equations. It is
entirely possible to work out a rather general form of function which will have
enough parameters and be sufficiently flexible for almost any hypothesis. The chief
difficulty is that if the equations be formulated with sufficient generality and flexi-
bility, there may be so many unknowns to solve that the number of cases available
may not be adequate to give reliable values for the unknown.... Direct application
of this method breaks down, however, when the number of possible configurations
becomes so large that no sample is large enough to provide an experience table ...
These statistical procedures have in common the operation involving a sacrifice of
information about the individual configurations. This sacrifice is made in order to
obtain broad enough classes to assure an adequate number of cases from the trial
sample in each class. It is an artifact to treat thousands of different configurations
as belonging to a single class, supposedly homogeneous. If the classes are too broad
and too heterogeneous, the statistician will make many bad guesses."
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lawyers mathematicians.""I0 This notion is dangerous. Pascal, him-
self a distinguished mathematician, saw this danger when he said,
"This man is a good mathematician.... He would take me for a
proposition."2 31 Aristotle (who in this respect diverged from Plato)
also saw this danger when he distinguished "legal" and "equitable"
justice. "Legal justice", in transactions "between man and man",
he said, rests on mathematical equality, according to which "it
makes no difference whether it is a good or a bad man" who has
violated a legal rule. But, he said, "equitable justice" is a "correc-
tion of legal justice" and a "better kind" of justice. It mercifully
considers the unique individual circumstances which demand a
departure from the rigid rules.
For a democracy, Aristotle is a better guide than Plato. Plato,
who exalted mathematics, sought an exact science of government
conceived after the manner of mathematics.282 Correlatively, his
ideal state was totalitarian; he detested democracy for its flexibility.
Aristotle, far more interested as a scientist in living organisms than
in physics and mathematics, was correlatively more sympathetic to
political democracy. It is no accident that Aristotle underscored
flexible "equity", that his formulations of the nature of "equity"
have influenced courts and legal thinkers throughout the Western
world. 2 3
The belief in the possibility of mathematicizing psychology
usually accompanies the yearning to predict precisely the conduct
of individual human beings in all circumstances. This belief, there-
fore, is often a concomitant of a thoroughly deterministic philosophy,
230 59 YALE L.J. at 272.
231 PASCAl, PENSEES No. 36 (1670). See also DE BROGLIE, MATTER AND LIGHT
280-282 (1939): "The spirit of geometry is needed, for without it we could give
no precision to our ideas and arguments. But there is need also for the spirit of
intuition; it is required to recall to us without ceasing that reality is too fluid and
too rich to be contained in its entirety within the strict and abstract framework
of our ideas."
232 See SABnm, A HiSTORY Or PoLImCAL THEORY CC. 3, 4 (1937) ; ef. FiTE, THE
PLATo, Tm PLAToNic LEOnm, especially 225-262 (1934). Taylor writes: "We must
remember that though mathematics was by no means the only science cultivated in
the Academy, it was that which appealed most to Plato himself, and that in which
the Academy exercised the most thoroughgoing influence on later developments ....
We naturally expect to find traces of this special preoccupation with the philosophy
of mathematics which is characteristic of the work of the school. .... For a real
comprehension of Plato's thought it is indispensable to have a grasp of the modem
logic of arithmetic." TAYLOR, PLATO 504, 505 (2d ed. 1927). The quotations of
Aristotle are from his NIcnoi~uECn ETmcs 1131 et seq. (Ross transl.).
233 See Usatorre v. The Victoria, 172 F. 2d 434, n. 11-16 (2d Cir. 1949).
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one which deems illusory any measure of real choice for human
beings.23 Persons with such a mathematicizing inclination fre-
quently find satisfaction in such expressions as "social engineering"
or "legal engineering", expressions which indicate that human be-
ings should be treated (a la Plato) as the totalitarians treat them-
as inert things to be manipulated or rigidly controlled.
I do not at all mean that Cohen suggests such a mathematical
or totalitarian "science" of government a la Plato.3 4a Yet Cohen,
in his dangerous neglect of the unique individual, is closer to Plato's
thinking than to Aristotle's. I say this despite the fact that, when
Cohen writes of the application of mathematics to legal thinking, he
has in mind chiefly Einstein's mathematical achievements in over-
coming what I have labelled "physical subjectivity". For see how
Cohen wants to utilize those achievements. "The real importance of
Einstein", says Cohen, 3 5 "is his development of formulae by which
many different accounts of the same physical event may be correlated
with each other, so that from the position and direction of an event
in any physical system we can calculate its position and direction
in any other system." Cohen believes it will be possible, in some
such way, to mathematicize the judicial process. That is, he hopes
we can use differing human perspectives inter-changeably, that we
can work out "translations from any perspective to any other
perspective."" 0 So, Cohen seems to say, if we know the "value
field" of a particular trial judge, we can some day, by "translation",
discover a method of discounting, and thereby predicting, the way
in which his "value field" will affect his version of the facts of a
case.237 Cohen suggests that such an accomplishment is "no empty
dream", although today this job of "translating" is done "roughly,
rudely and implicitly. 23  Perhaps it can be said that Cohen's
belief in the possibility of such "translations" is but another form
of the fatuous belief that all the "private", hidden, idiosyncratic
reactions of any man can be made public" i.e., that this kind of
"subjectivity" now ineluctible, some day will be eliminated. 39
234 See, e.g., BROWN, op. cit. supra note 208, at 25.
234, Cf. COHEN, ErmcAL SYsTEms AND LEGAL IDFALs 230, 235 (1933).
235 59 YALE L. J. at 243 (1950).
236 Id. at 243, 244, 271.
237 Id. at 243, 244.
238 Ibid.
230 TAYLOR, op. cit. supra note 232, at 326 ff., discusses Plato's idea of a "public
world" and "private worlds".
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Such a resort to mathematics, in the belief that in that way
one can thus be rid of the effects of individual reactions, may per-
'haps betoken a fear of the unique because of its unforseeability.
The hope of eliminating those effects by science, of being able ulti-
mately to treat them as if non-existent for prediction purposes, may
be a fear-inspired form of self-delusion.
It may occur to someone to say that the "field" concept in
physics is historically related to that of the "gestalt" concept in
psychology;24 that Lewin and others combine the two concepts as
the foundation of a "science" of predicting individual behavior;
and that therefore I am inconsistent in using the "gestalt" concept
and in nevertheless asserting that such a science is impossible. My
answer is that the unanalyzable individual "gestalts" of particular
trial judges or jurors, when reacting to the particular witnesses in
particular law suits, are unique, "private", not fully communicable
to other persons, and not predictable.
Cohen's unwisdom in incautiously borrowing analogies from
mathematics and physics may be further shown by noting how that
practice could be turned against him: (1) The development in
modern mathematics of the invaluable idea of non-Euclidean geom-
etry241 has induced discussion of two-dimensional, three-dimensional,
and multi-dimensional creatures, each sort with its own peculiar
perspective. Einstein and Infeld say that if "two-dimensional
creatures" were to meet new experiences that would not fit into the
two-dimensional geometry they had learned, they would "certainly
make every possible effort to hold on to it", by inventing all sorts
of ingenious, complicated two-dimensional explanations of its diverg-
ence from those new experiences.2"2 So (forgetting for the moment
240 See CAssrRER, Tim PROBLEM OF KNOwLEDGE 102, 212, 213 (1950); See
BROWN, op. cit. sujtra note 208, at 65, as to the application of the "gestalt" or "organ-
ismic" view, in biology.
241 The idea of non-Eudlidean (or postulational) thinking has spread beyond the
realm of mathematics and physics, and not merely by way of analogy. For it in-
volves a new, liberating, understanding of the nature of axioms in any realm of
thought, as not "self-evident" truths but as assumptions which can be challenged
and revised in the light of their consequences. See, e.g., FRANK, FATE AXD FREEDOM
298-308 (1945).
242 EiNSTEIW AND INpELD, op. cit. supra note 221, at 237-239. The struggle in
science to save old theories by inventing complicated qualifications has often been
told. Illustrative are the stories of the Ptolemaic theory, that of phlogiston, that of
the ether, and that of several Newtonian theories. See e.g., SuLLiAN, ASPECTS Op
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the dangers of borrowing mathematical analogies) we might say this
of Cohen, et al.: Confining themselves to observation of upper
courts, their legal thinking is two-dimensional; when, occasionally,
they consider specific trial-court decisions, and thus gaze at a three-
dimensional legal world, they invent complicated excuses for the
failure of their two-dimensional prediction apparatus to produce
predictions of such decisions. (2) This also may be suggested by
physical analogies: Einstein and Infeld say that "classical" physics,
relying on Euclidean concepts, is valid as a special or limiting in-
stance, i.e., is valid if restricted in its. application.243 Similarly, we
may say that the conventional theory of decision-making and of
decision-prediction holds good whenever the complexities of trial-
court fact-disputes (caused by credibility difficulties) are absent-
as when, in a trial, the facts are undisputed or when a case comes
into an upper court (the facts having already been "found" by the
trial court). The error of Cohen & Co. is that they apply this theory
to the decisions in trials where the credibility difficulty is painfully
present; they forget that usually, in such cases, the trial courts'
fact-findings will bind the upper courts;244 and they never consider
the trial courts' gestalts.
This attitude of Cohen & Co. recalls what William James said
of thinkers who insist that invariably nature is orderly and fully
comprehensible by man: They are expressing, said James, their
"sense of how pleasant... [their] ... intellect would feel if it had
a nature of that sort to deal with." When that mood dominates
SCIENCE 58-63 (1925) ; Swan, What Is Science?, RESEARCH IN TM SOCIAL SCIENCES
11 (1931). SuLLIvAN, Tim LnniTATIoNs OF SCIENCE 183 (Pelican ed. 1938), says:
"Miracles of mathematical ingenuity were performed in the attempt to account for
the properties of light in terms of the Newtonian concepts."
243 EINSTEIN AND IN ELD, op. cit. supra note 221, at 252: "The old theory is a
special or limiting case of the new one."
244 There is a difference between the "old theory" in physics and the "old
theory" of judicial decisions: (1) "If", says Einstein and Infeld, "the gravitational
forces are weak, the old Newtonian law turns out to be a good approximation to
the new laws of gravitation .... If the old laws follow from the new one when
the gravitational forces are weak, the deviations from the Newtonian law of gravi-
tation can be expected only for comparatively strong gravitational forces." EINsTE
AND INrELD, op. cit. supra note 221, at 252, 253. Therefore the old laws are good
enough for ordinary terrestrial purposes. (2) But in ordinary law suits, in the
trial courts, the equivalent of "gravitational forces"--the multitude of unique "sub-
jective" factors-is by no means "weak". Consequently, the "old theory" in matters
judicial will not serve in most cases.
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such persons, they pay no attention to unique, unruly, unpredictable,
individual happenings.
XVII.
Let us take stock. The following striking features emerge from
our survey of trials:
(1) Witnesses do not uniformly react to the past events about
which they testify. (2) In most trials, the witnesses orally tell
conflicting stories to the trial court concerning those events. (3) In
any such case, for decision purposes, what we call the "facts" of a
case, derives, at best, from the trial judge's or jury's belief as to the
reliability of the stories told by some, rather than others, of the
disagreeing witnesses. (4) There are few uniformities in the forma-
tion of those beliefs of trial judges or juries, and no rules to aid
them in forming those beliefs. (5) Those beliefs determine the fate
of most litigants because, in the very few cases that are appealed,
the upper courts usually accept the trial court's beliefs,245 since
those beliefs involve trial-court "fact-discretion" with which the
upper courts seldom interfere. (6) To make matters more compli-
cated, those beliefs are often but purported beliefs, since the "gestalt"
element obscures the real beliefs. (7) Moreover, the beliefs, real
or purported, are often not reported to anyone. If such a trial-court
belief is not reported, and if the trial court's decision is appealed,
usually the upper court will fictionally assume that the trial court
had a belief, based on some selected part of the conflicting oral
testimony, which will justify the trial court's decision.
If you put together all these items, you must conclude that
those who glibly talk of predicting future decisions, in cases as yet
untried, have grossly exaggerated litigation-certainty.
XVIII.
Consider an impeccable legal rule, one that is reasonable and
wholly satisfactory from an ethical viewpoint, e.g., the rule con-
demning murder or the rule prohibiting a trustee from realizing
personal gain from the use of trust funds. If, due to mistaken
trial-court fact-finding, such a rule is "enforced" by being "applied"
to spurious facts (i.e., facts that never happened) so that a man is
hanged for a murder he didn't commit, or another man is adjudged
to pay $25,000 for the act of misusing trust funds which actually he
245 At least so far as they relate to "testimonial" inferences.
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didn't misuse-then what? Then, in reality, the rule is wrongly
enforced, misapplied, with outrageously unjust human consequences,
from which upper courts can seldom give relief.246
It is amazing that Cohen, of all persons, should not be interested
actively and persistently in such unfortunate products of such court
operations. For, in his book, he criticizes severely, and with ample
justification, philosophers and legal thinkers who (a) dwell on the
"contents" of legal rules, and (b) neglect to question the conse-
quences of those rules when they get into action. In short, a wide
chasm stretches between Cohen's preachments about legal criticism
and his own practices as a legal critic.
Let us, once more, in Cohen's own words, describe his preach-
ments: "The potentialities of law"--remember he defines "law"
as rules-are never "irrelevant to legal criticism. 2 47 The "valu-
ation of law in terms of its expressed content is, in short, inadequate
and fallacious . . . because . . . it neglects such important legal-
ethical problems as... the nature of their enforcement. 2 48  The
"valuation of law in terms of its expressed content breaks down in
crucial cases, simply because the actual effects ... are ignored.
249
"Abstraction is necessary in all thought. [But] ... what renders a
given standard of valuation inadequate is not its mere abstractness
but the fact that the abstraction involved is not exhaustive or repre-
sentative of all the values implicated in law." And this fault seems
definitely ascribable "to standards which, abstracting from all the
results of law, evaluate either the form or the expressed content or
the purpose of law. .. ,,'o Valuably, "there has arisen in this
country and in this century the call for an analysis of anciently
ignored discrepancies' 1 between 'law in action', between what courts
240 See In re Fried, 161 F. 2d 453, 462-464 (2d Cir. 1947); United States v.
Forness, 125 F. 2d 928, 942-943 (2d Cir. 1942); McAllister, The Big Case, 64 HAIv.
L. REv. 26, 56 (1950); Frank, Cardozo and The Upper-Court Myth, 13 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 369, 382 (1948).
247 COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDmE.s 69 (1933).
248 Id. at 63.
249 Id. at 65.
2 o Id. at 55.
',I Here Cohen overlooks Aristotle, who, in his "Rhetoric", elaborately described
thcs - discrepancies in the actual conduct of trials. See discussion in Frank, Modern
and Aiwknt Legal Pragmatism, 25 NoTRE DAME LAW. 460, 485-488 (1950). See also
AImsTOTLE, PoLITcs, 1292b, 12 if: "In many states, the constitution . . . although
not democratic . . . may be administered democratically, and conversely in other
states the established constitution may incline to democracy, but may be administered
in an oligarchical spirit. This most often happens after a revolution ... "
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are saying and what courts are doing. .... 2 2 Without "a clear
vision of these discrepancies, law dissipates its forces..., and stim-
ulates new evils .... "'51 "To identify result and purpose is to dim
our vision of that omnipresent human fallibility which separates
hope from achievement. '21 4 There should be "an insistence upon
the ethical primacy of actual legal results.... _=15 "Omniscience,
even in the narrow field of legal tchniques, is denied to man, and
numerous indeed are the cases where jural purposes have completely
miscarried through miscalculations of legal technique."' ' 56 It is
essential to stress "the undeniable and forgotten fact that in order
to value anything intelligently we must know what it is.' '2 5 7 The
"first condition" of "intelligent judgment" is "that we know what
we are talking about." 8 We should "therefore dismiss as untrue
all claims for the attainment of certainty in legal criticism which
dispense with the arduous task of discovering what law does and
can do."' 259 "Most errors of juristic criticism arise from an illicit
simplification of questions that we ought to face. ' 2 6  Proposed
criteria of such criticism "must face the scientific test of empirical
confirmation",26 1 a "testing... in the light of immediate observa-
tion."2 "2 "If you want to understand something, observe it in action;
... [this] approach leads to an appraisal... of human beings who
are affected by law.126 3 Although the maintenance of "peace is an
enduring human ideal, a first requirement of the good life and one
particularly susceptible of achievement through law, . . . there is
no truth in the supposition that peace .. .constitutes a valid and
adequate norm for all activity. ' 264 It is "a fallacy to infer that the
settling of . . . disputes is the sole norm of law. It is the right
252 Col N, ETmcAL SYsTEMs AND LEGAL IDEALs 237 (1933). Pound, who invented
the description of "law in books" as opposed to "law in action", has often himself
ignored the distinction.
25 Id. at 63.
254 Id. at 68 n. 12.
255 Ibid.
256 Id. at 67.
2-7 Id. at 51.
2s Id. at 51-52.
259 Id. at 53.
260 Id. at 287.
261 Id. at 121.
262 Id. at 124.
263 1 MOD. L. REV. at 8 (1937).
264 COHEN, ETHicAL SysTEms AND LEGAL IDEALS 75 (1933).
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settling of conflicts ...which the law ought to secure. '  "No
greater service can be performed on behalf of noble ideals than to
free them from the extravagant pretensions with which they have
been encumbered by followers more loving than wise."2 66
See, then, what Cohen thus sagaciously asserts: We should
evaluate all legal rules by their practical human consequences; the
mere content or purpose of a rule, no matter how splendid, will not
alone suffice, but the actual effects of its enforcement, the actual
results in action, are what counts; not the settling of disputes, but
their "right settling", is the proper standard in appraising the work
of the courts; faulty "legal technique", caused by human falli-
bilities, has produced "numerous cases" of miscarriage of admirable
"jural purposes".
How do these comments square with Cohen's practices as a
legal critic-with his unwillingness to recognize the human conse-
quences, the impact on the "good life", of mistakes traceable to
the "legal techniques" of trial court fact-findings? How does Cohen
explain his steadfast refusal to test his own criteria of legal criticism
by "empirical confirmation", through "immediate observation" of
trial courts in action and through noting the relation of their actions,
in finding facts, to their decisions and to those of upper courts?
Why, when evaluating "judicial behavior", does he not-taking to
heart his own wise words that "in order to value anything intelli-
gently we must know what it is",-learn, by extensive observing,
what it is that happens in trials when witnesses disagree?
Borchard's Convicting The Innocent, appeared in 1932; its
revelations should have stimulated Cohen, in the light of observations
of actual court doings, to re-examine his conceptions of "judicial
behavior". Why did not Cohen discuss Borchard's revelations in
Cohen's own book published in 1933, or his articles published in
1935, 1937 and 1950? Why has he failed to see that errors in his
own "juristic criticism" are bound to arise from his "illicit simplifi-
cation of questions", which he "ought to face", but doesn't? Why
does he not, on behalf of the noble moral ideals, concerning the
judicial process, which he sponsors, "free them from the extravagant
pretensions with which they have been encumbered by followers
more loving than wise?"
265 Id. at 89.
260 Id. at 72.
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One can but surmise. Perhaps this is the answer: (1) He wants
to believe it possible to work out a "systematic knowledge of legal
decisions" based on the predictable "uniformities" of "judicial
behavior". He therefore feels it unbearable to contemplate that-
because of disputes about facts and the lack of uniformities in the
exercise of trial-court "fact discretion", and in the "gestalts" of
trial judges and juries-most future decisions are inherently un-
predictable. (2) That feeling evokes in him a stubborn refusal to
admit, to himself or to others, that the unpredictability of most
decisions, before trial, results (a) principally from the incurable
unknowability, in advance, of trial-court fact-findings (or gestalts)
in most law suits, and (b) not from rule-uncertainty, i.e., from the
vagueness of some precedents or doubts as to what precedents the
courts will apply. For, were it true (as he has brought himself to
believe) that the latter is the only or the chief source of legal un-
certainty, then such uncertainty would not now be disturbingly
pervasive, and could, by his prediction-device, be reduced to a still
smaller compass, thereby making possible the creation of "syste-
matic knowledge of decisions". (3) Accordingly, he refuses to
observe what trial courts actually do, because of his more or less
unconscious fear that such observation would compel him to recog-
nize the vast extent and immense consequences of litigation-uncer-
tainty-and therefore of legal uncertainty in general. (4) On that
account, he has blinded himself to the existence of the moral prob-
lem posed by the vagaries and vicissitudes of trials, and flings a
"sneer word"--"mystic"--at those who try to call those vagaries
and vicissitudes to his attention. 67
Cohen, alas, is not unique in underscoring the role of morals
in legal criticism while neglecting trials and trial courts. Even
Pound, who has not always neglected them, said but a few years
ago: "If it is not possible wholly to exclude the subjective personal
element" in the judicial process, "the history of law shows we can
go very far toward doing it."'268 But how far have we gone in exclud-
ing the "personal element" in judicial fact-finding? Have we done
267 Obviously, Cohen intended the word "mystic" to be denigrative. This device
of using pejoratives to describe the views of those with whom one disagrees, Cohen
himself seems to deplore. See, e.g., 59 YArP L. J. at 244. For a fuller discussion of
such "epithetical jurisprudence", see Frank, Epithetical Jurisprudence and The S.E.C.,
18 N.Y.U. L. Q. REv. 317 (1941).
268 POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUOH LAw 33 (1942).
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so in our use of the jury?20 9 Have we, in our law schools or else-
where, trained future trial judges to become aware of their uncon-
scious "personal" prejudices with respect to witnesses and, thus
aware, to overcome those prejudices?
No decent, sensible man will deny that to ethicize the legal
rules is essential. But that need has already won widespread recog-
nition. It is far more important today to publicize the almost com-
pletely neglected need to ethicize the process of finding facts in
our trial courts.
XIX.
Since, whatever the reason, Cohen has effectively blinded him-
self to the moral problem that stems from defective fact-finding,
and so has made himself largely unaware of that problem, he should
be absolved from any charge of direct moral irresponsibility in delib-
erately minimizing its gravity. But, he should now courageously
confront it, since he is eminent as a legal thinker concerned with
morals.270
I strongly incline to believe that, because of ineradicable human
frailties, nothing like a complete solution can ever be contrived;
that men must accept (as they do some accidents causing death)
the unavoidability of some of the tragedies caused by mistaken trial-
court fact-finding. However, I do believe that many of those trag-
edies could be avoided, by eliminating (or reducing the effects of)
some of their causes, so that, to some extent at least, we need not
continue to justify Learned Hand's comment, "I must say that, as
a litigant, I should dread a law suit beyond almost anything short
of sickness and death. 2 7' To that end, I have elsewhere suggested
the following reforms:
1. Reduce the excesses of the present fighting method of
conducting trials:
(a) Have the government accept more responsibility for seeing
that all practically available, important, evidence is introduced at a
trial of a civil suit.
209 Pound has praised juries for their "lawlessness", their ability to make legal
rules to suit themselves. See Pound, Law In Books and Law In Action, 44 Am. L.
REv. 12, 18-19 (1910).
270 A similar statement should be made concerning Jerome Hall, who also
minimizes the problem and who is also a legal thinker much concerned with moral
problems, see notes 81, 103, 104 supra.
271 Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach The Heart of The Matter, 3
Lcturs o N LErAL Topics 89, 105 (1926).
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(b) Have trial judges play a more active part in examining
witnesses.
(c) Require court-room examination of witnesses to be more
humane and intelligent.
(d) Use non-partisan "testimonial experts", called by the judge,
to testify concerning the detectible fallibilities of witnesses, circum-
spectly employ "lie-detectors".
(e) Discard most of the exclusionary evidence rules.
(f) Provide liberal pre-trial "discovery" for defendants in
criminal cases.
2. Reform legal education by moving it far closer to courthouse
and law-office actualities, largely through the use of the apprentice
method of teaching.
3. Provide and require special education for future trial judges,
such education to include intensive psychological self-exploration by
each prospective trial judge.
4. Provide and require special education for future prosecutors
which, among other things, will emphasize the obligation of a prose-
cutor to obtain and to bring out all important evidence, including
that which favors the accused.
5. Provide and require special education for the police so that
they will be unwilling to use the "third degree".
6. Have judges abandon their official robes, conduct trials less
formally, and in general give up "robe-ism".
7. Require trial judges in all cases to publish special findings
of fact.
8. Abandon jury trials except in major criminal cases.
9. At any rate, while we have the jury system, overhaul it:
(a) Require fact-verdicts (special verdicts) in all jury trials.
(b) Use informed "special" juries.
(c) Educate men in the schools for jury service.
10. Encourage the openly disclosed individualization of law
suits by trial judges; to that end, revise most of the legal rules so
that they avowedly grant such individualizing power to trial judges,
instead of achieving individualization surreptitiously as we now
largely do.
11. Reduce the formality of appeals by permitting the trial
judge to sit with the upper court on an appeal from his decision,
but without a vote.
12. Have talking movies of trials.
13, Teach the non-lawyers to recognize that trial courts have
more importance than upper courts
272
I suggested those reforms most tentatively. For far better
minds than mine are needed to meet the problem effectively. As
Felix Cohen has such a mind, I urge him to join in that undertaking.
He, of all men, should not complain that the problem may, in
272 See FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 422-423. The details of these reforms are
discussed in the earlier pages of that book.
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part, be insoluble. For, in his book 73 he quotes, with applause, these
wise words of Bentham: "It is always something to see where the
difficulty lies, although it should be insuperable; and to point out
the only means by which the best solution can be given, although
that solution should not be as satisfactory as one wishes.... By
showing the real uncertainty of the most conclusive arguments
that can be offered on the subject, it will prevent us from giving to
less conclusive arguments more than their due weight; it will enable
us to unravel the web of sophistry, and to humble the pride of
declamation: it will be of service, insofar as the caution that
accompanies a salutary doubt is preferable to the rashness that
may be the result of a misconception." 74
273 Co HE, op. cit. supra note 252, at 288.
274 BFNTHAM, I WORKS 178 (1843).
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